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P&L – Profit and Loss  
RBS – Royal Bank of Scotland  
SEC – Securities and Exchange Commission      
SFAS – Statement of Financial Accounting Standard       
SG – Société Général





The core topic of this dissertation encompasses the impacts, magnitudes and possible 
treatments of Sovereign Debt valued at Fair Value within financial institutions. The European 
Sovereign Debt Crisis had heavily affected the economic and financial environment and 
consequently, the banking sector is facing some challenges to handle it.  The accounting 
treatment and classification of Sovereign Debt is under the scope of IAS 39 – Financial 
Instruments, Recognition and Measurements. Considering this scenario, the purpose of the 
case is to understand the effect of the Greek Sovereign Debt crisis in the three most exposed 
French banks. Actually, the critical theme is to apprehend how each bank embraced the 
international accounting standards and the fair value concept in their financial statements. The 
different adoptions taken by banks are justified by the prudential ratios that banks are compelled 
to achieve, under the strictly regulated banking environment. All in all, from my analysis and 
considering that the three banks are under the same supervisor, and from the same country, 
Greek Sovereign Debt was classified under three different captions and almost in its entirely 
according to internal models - Fair Value Level 3. Notwithstanding, the mark-to-market 
approach is indeed the best solution for the financial sector, but regulators and standards 
policies must unravel the current shortfalls, under more mandatory disclosures, guided and 
exhaustive standards and stricter capital requirements in order to restore market’s confidence 
and reach a healthy banking sector.  
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The imperative theme addressed in this dissertation is the Fair Value Accounting approach 
within the financial sector. The last years were marked with a financial meltdown worldwide. 
After the sub-prime crisis in the United States, markets had been suffering some struggling. 
Consequently, accounting methodologies have been questioned, namely, the pros and cons 
arising out from the Fair Value Accounting. 
  
First of all, the concept and definition of Fair Value is presented. Thus, the current debate 
regarding the benefits and limitations of Fair Value Accounting is exhaustively analyzed, 
enhancing the possible alternative to this approach – the Historical Cost approach. What’s 
more, considering the nature of a bank’s financial assets, it would be expected their fair value 
measurement due to the fact that, it is the best approach to reach updated and transparent 
balance sheets. Nonetheless, because of the pro-cyclicality inherent to fair value and its 
limitations to what concerns the Level 3, some experts do not advocate this opinion. 
  
Under these circumstances, the financial instrument subject to analysis in this dissertation is the 
Greek Sovereign Debt. In fact, Government Bonds are the heart of the matter of the European 
Crisis and they were appealing to banks because can be easily used as collateral. Additionally, 
the Basel Regulatory framework allowed for the zero-risk weighting of bonds issued by 
Eurozone governments. 	  
	  
According to International Accounting Standards (IAS) 39, this type of financial asset can be 
classified under two of the fourth available categories: Fair Value through Profit & Loss, 
Available-for-Sale Financial Assets, Held-to-Maturity and Loans and Receivables. 
Henceforward, depending on the previous classification, the accounting treatment and impact 
affects banks financial statements differently. In this sense, a presentation of the standards 
applied to classification, measurement and recognition of financial instruments is presented. 
Bearing in mind that the analysis is focus on Europe, the International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) and IAS where chosen.  
  
All in all, this dissertation is divided in two main sections: 
 
-The first one compromises a general approach to the Fair Value concept and its application 
within financial institutions. In this section, initially the history of the fair value concept is 
addressed as well as its application within assets, liabilities and equity. Likewise, the differences 
between the three different levels of the Fair Value hierarchy are exhaustively discriminated, 
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due to the fact it is one the most controversialist shortfalls associated to the Fair Value 
Accounting. Last but not least, an economic and financial approach to the European Sovereign 
Debt crisis is given, focusing on the special case of Greece.  
  
-The second part is a practical case, where an analysis of three French banks most exposed to 
the Greek Sovereign Debt is done. In fact, France, which is the second largest economy of 
Europe and the fifth worldwide, in nominal figures, is most exposed country and, the three 
banks chosen – BNP Paribas, Société Générale and Crédit Agricole – represent more than 60% 
of the French banking sector.  
 
Even considering that the three banks are under the same supervisor, and following the 
available options permitted by IAS 39, understanding how each bank treated and classified their 
Sovereign Debt is the core objective of this dissertation. Finally, the capital requirements 
required by the banks’ regulation authorities play an important role in this analysis: the losses 
recorded by each bank affects directly their ability to achieve the compulsory solvency ratios.  
Fair Value Dissertation     9	  
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 History 
 
Fair Value (FV) is not a new concept or a recent trend. It is part of the financial reporting for a 
long time, nevertheless its application and extension increased sharply in the last years.  
 
Fair Value measurement dates back to the seventies’. The first noteworthy publication was 
done by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) through the APB (Accounting 
Principles Board) 18, which brought in the Equity method for investments. Likewise, the APB 29 
“Accounting for Nonmonetary Transactions” and Financial Accounting Standard 15 (FAS) 
“Accounting by Debtors and Creditors for Troubled Debt Restructuring” were launched in this 
period.  During the eighties’, FV was extended to other areas, for instance pensions.  
 
Moreover, in the nineties two factors enlarged FV application. Firstly, within the technology 
boom, and relating with the Internet emergence, many Mergers and Acquisitions appeared in 
the big scenario. Consequently, FASB noticed that they were not precisely reported because of 
the valuation of intangible assets and goodwill, which was subject to impairment tests from this 
time on. Therefore, a deeply analysis was made and several statements were announced 
regarding Business Combinations.  Secondly, FAS 107 “Disclosures about Fair Value in 
Financial Instruments” and FAS 115 “Accounting for certain Investments in Equity and Debt 
Securities” were both published in 1991 and 1993, respectively, which boosted the use of the 
FV option within the financial institutions. Both areas continue to face nowadays a huge impact 
with fair value policies.   
 
Finally, in the last decade FV had undergone an increasing utilization. Several reasons are 
behind this occurrence. In a nutshell, globalization had changed the big picture and, one of the 
immediate consequences, relies on the fact that investors, as well as financial analysts and 
regulators, started to ask for more relevant information.  
 
As a consequence, this amplified the importance of more accurate financial statements. Also, 
traditional reporting standards do not provide actual and real values, but on the contrary, they 
are based on historical values. According to Zyla (Zyla, 2010)1, traditional reporting presents a 
lack of relevance and scarcity of information to what concerns the value of internally generated 
intangible assets. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, intangible assets continued to attain even 
more significance changing the overall economic environment.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 ZYLA, Mark. L, (2010), Fair Value Measurements: Practical Guidance and Implementation 
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In 2006, FASB promoted FASB ASC 820, Fair Value Measurements and Disclosures 
(Statement of Financial Accounting Standard (SFAS) no. 157) with the purpose of “define fair 
value, establish a framework for measuring fair value, and expand disclosure about fair value 
measurements.”2This statement was primarily partially implemented due to the polemic 
generated, and FASB just got it fully implemented, for both financial and nonfinancial items, 
from 2009 on. In the meantime, the subprime crisis emerged. Both facts, the implementation of 
SFAS 157 and the financial collapse, caused some controversy around the consequences and 
implications of Fair Value Accounting (FVA). Some critics even affirmed that the implementation 
of the mentioned standard had, at least, worsened the credit crisis, subject further developed.  
 
Before further analysis, it is relevant to briefly present the two organizations responsible for the 
development and implementation of the accounting standards and policies – FASB and IASB 
(International Accounting Standard Board). FASB is the American, private and non-profit 
organization designated for the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to monitor and 
regulate the accounting of US public companies. FASB is responsible for developing the well-
known U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).  IASB has the same 
characteristics but it is based in London and develops the International Financial Report 
Standards (IFRS). It was founded in 2001 but it is the successor of IASC that dates from 1973. 
Nonetheless, along this paper it is mentioned International Accounting Standards (IAS), the 
previous standards inherited from IASC. Last but not least, U.S. GAAP are more historical cost-
based, whereas IASB presents a principle-based approach.  
 
In this sense, globalization and its huge impact in the overall economies had underpinned the 
necessity of homogenizing the accounting standards worldwide. Thus, both accounting entities 
are trying to produce increasingly standardized and common reporting rules. This attempt 
started in 2002 and it is known as the Convergent Project, which promised a successful 
convergence, as soon as possible, as well as its maintainability. Furthermore, in 2006 both 
agencies had reaffirmed their commitment to converge U.S. GAP and IFRS through the 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). This last one “reflects standard-setting context of the 
‘roadmap’ developed by the SEC in consultation with the IASB, FASB and European 
Commission for the removal of the reconciliation requirement for non-US companies that use 
IFRS’s and are registered in the US. The work programme includes a project on measuring fair 
value.”3 One of the main objectives is to achieve harmonization, which will just happen when all 
the companies and institutions throughout follow the same standard.  
 
IASB assured that this convergence was not related with an enlargement of the FV application 
but, oppositely, it was made to clarify and uniform the different FV measurements along the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 SFAS 157, Fair Value Measurements, paragraph 1 
3 IASB, Discussion Paper, Fair Value Measurements. Part 1: Invitation to Comment and relevant IFRS guidance, 26th 
November 2006. 
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IFRS’s.  
2.2 Fair Value concept  
 
The FV concept is an accounting policy that has been studied and developed in an on-going 
perspective. According to both IASB - IFRS 13 – and FASB - SFAS 157, fair value can be 
defined as follows: 
 
“Fair value is the price that would be received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an 
orderly transaction between market participants at the measurement date.”4 
 
In order to a better understanding, the FV concept will be analyzed through the definition of 




Fair Value is defined as an exit price, which means the price to sell an asset or to transfer a 
liability to a market participant at the measurement date, instead of being an entry price. This 
definition presupposes, on the one hand that, the FV is not mandatory the price to the acquiring 
entity, and on the other hand, it might not be the price paid for the actual owner’s entity. 
Moreover, FV as an exit price, might not be based on historical costs neither on future possible 
transactions.   
 
There are some differences that make the distinction between entry and exit price very 
important. The potential of the asset or liability to the overall performance of an organization 
may affect the final measurement. As an example, there are some intangible assets – 
intellectual property - that are much more important to one entity than to other. If the potential 
buyer’s entity would be able to perform much better because that asset is essential and 
complementary to some existing and/or on-going service / product, that entity might take this 
impact in its estimative, which would increase the price willing to pay.   
 
Moreover, the FV of an asset or liability must be an exit price “whether that price is directly 
observable or estimated using a valuation technique.”5 In the case of an unobservable price, the 
reporting entity must consider the characteristics of the market participants that would enter into 
the transaction (concepts developed further on).  
 
Finally, regarding the “price” notion, transaction costs do not enter to this calculation apart from 
location costs. Transaction costs are directly related to the transaction itself and are not a 
characteristic of the asset or liability. “Transaction costs are the incremental direct costs to sell 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4IASB - IFRS 13 – and FASB - SFAS 157 
5 ZYLA, Mark. L, (2010), Fair Value Measurements: Practical Guidance and Implementation 
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the asset or transfer the liability.”6 
 
As mentioned above, the only exceptions are the costs related to location, i.e., the ones 
incurred to transfer the asset/liability to or from the most advantageous market. When location is 
a characteristic of an asset those costs must be taken into consideration when estimating the 
price in the most advantageous market.  
 
This definition does not take into consideration the principle of continuity, i.e., it does not 
consider the fact of the company wants or not to maintain the asset and/or liability.  
 
Last but not least, this definition considers a market-based measurement instead of an entity-
based one. Thus, it deliberates the market assumptions that would be used by market 
participants as well as assumptions about risk.  
 
ii. The asset or liability:  
 
“A fair value measurement is for a particular asset or liability.” 7 Hence, to achieve the FV, it 
must be considered the characteristics of the asset or liability that the market participants would 
consider at the measurement date, in order to sell the asset or transfer the liability.  
 
The asset or liability can be a specific and unique one or a group of assets or liabilities, 
depending on the unit of account defined for that asset or liability by the IFRS’s.  
 
iii. The transaction  
 
As mentioned above, the definition of fair value presupposes an orderly transaction. An orderly 
transaction is the one that can be seen before the measurement date, where the usual 
marketing activities for the asset or the liability, being measured, occur. According to IFRS 13, 
in order to measure the FV of an asset or liability, the transaction must take place either in the 
principal market or, in its absence, in the most advantageous market for that asset or liability to 
be negotiated.  
 
The definition of transaction is critical and involves another two definitions: the principal market 
and the most advantageous market.  
 
To what concerns the first one, entities should not have any difficulty to describe the principal 
market, besides the fact that it is mandatory to consider all the information available. According 
to IFRS 13, the principal market is “in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the market in 
which the entity would normally enter into a transaction to sell the asset or to transfer the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 ZYLA, Mark. L, (2010), Fair Value Measurements: Practical Guidance and Implementation 
7 Exposure Draft ED/2009/5 Fair Value Measurement 
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liability”8. Additionally, the same standard states that “the principal market is the market with the 
greatest volume and level of activity for the asset or liability.” 8 
 
Nonetheless, the principal market for the same asset or liability can differ within organizations. 
In this sense, the principal market must be considered from the perspective of the reporting 
entity. Additionally, the price to sell the asset or transfer a liability, at the measurement date, 
must be the one in the principal market, even if there is more advantageous price in a different 
market. IFRS 13 defines the most advantageous market as the one “that maximizes the amount 
that would be received to sell the asset or minimizes the amount that would be paid to transfer 
the liability”8, excluding transaction and transportation costs.  
 
Evidently, the entity must have access to that specific market, but a transaction is not 
mandatory. In this case, “absence of an actual transaction”8, the FV measurement assumes a 
hypothetical transaction from the reporting entity’s point of view.  
 
“Because the transaction is hypothetical, it is necessary to consider the characteristics of 
market participants who would enter into a transaction for the asset or liability.”8 This takes us to 
the next description.  
 
iv. Market participants 
 
The market participants are the ones willing to transact in the principal market (or in the most 
advantageous market). According to IFRS 13, market participants must be:   
 
a) Independent; 
b) Knowledgeable, i.e. they have the necessary knowledge to enter into a transaction and 
it is supposed that they possess the same information regarding the asset or liability as 
the reporting entity;  
c) “Able to enter into a transaction for the asset or liability; and 
d) Willing to enter into a transaction for the asset or liability, i.e. they are motivated but not 
forced or otherwise compelled to do so.”9 
 
Last but not least, and following the same standard, it is not necessary to identify or specify the 
market participants, but describing them taking into consideration some characteristics, such as:  
 
a) Type of asset or liability; 
b) The principal market for the item to be negotiated; and 
c) “Market participants with whom the reporting entity would enter into a transaction in that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8  IFRS 13 – Fair Value Measurements 
9 SFAS 157	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market.”10 
2.2.1 Application to assets 
 
The FV measurement assumes the highest and best use by the market participants, which 
corresponds to the one that maximizes the value of the asset or liability. This assumption 
considers market participant’s perspective, independently whether it differs or not from the 
reporting entity’s one.  
 
This notion assumes the use of the asset that is physically possible, legally permissible (all the 
physical characteristics and legal restrictions that market participants considered to price an 
asset) and financially feasible. To what concerns to the last attribute, it evaluates whether or not 
“the use of the asset that is physically possible and legally possible generates the adequate 
income or cash flows to produce an investment return that market participants would require 
from an investment in that asset is not its highest and best use.” 11 
 
Finally, according to SFAS 157, the highest and best use establishes two different valuation 
premises:  
i. In–use valuation premise - in the case when the highest and best use is achieved 
considering the asset as a combination with another group of assets or liabilities 
(installed or configured for this purpose). The fair value would be calculated taking into 
consideration that the transaction would occur with the same circumstances in both 
sides, i.e., the asset would be used with other assets as a group, or this group of assets 
would be available for all the market participants. Nevertheless, these factors will 
contribute to the calculation of the price but the asset will be always sold individually.  
 
ii. In-Exchange valuation premise – when the highest and best use of the asset is 
achieved on a stand-alone basis. Thus, the fair value would be the price received 
through a transaction to sell the asset to the market participants that would use the 
asset individually.  
 
The last valuation premise is the most important for this dissertation. For the specific case of 
financial assets, the individually measurement will reveal the benefits of holding the asset within 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 IFRS 13 – Fair Value Measurements 
11  ZYLA, Mark. L, (2010), Fair Value Measurements: Practical Guidance and Implementation 
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2.2.2 Application to liabilities and to entity’s own equity instruments 
 
According to IFRS 13, the FV measurement to liabilities and to entity’s own equity instruments 
undertakes that the liability or the equity instrument is actually transferred to the market 
participant, at the measurement date. In this sense, the concept considers a transfer price 
instead of extinguish price. The transfer of the liability or the entity’s own equity instrument 
assumes that they would remain outstanding.   
 
The concept of fair value for liabilities encompasses the definition of non-performance risk. 
According to Zyla12, this is the risk of an entity not fulfilling an obligation; it is supposed to be the 
same before and after the transaction. The reason behind this remains on the fact that market 
participants would not enter into a transfer if the risk of fulfillment changed without changing the 
price of the obligation itself.  
 
To what concerns this risk, it includes, but not only, the entity’s credit risk. An entity, in order to 
an accurate FV measurement, should consider all the risks that could influence the fulfillment of 
an obligation. Finally, the effect of its own credit risk, and the others ones relevant for this 
purpose, will depend on the type of the liability and must be reflected for all the periods that the 
FV measurement is done for the liability. There are two types of liabilities: financial and non-
financial liabilities. 
 
Another topic that must be deeply analyzed is the way the FV measurement is done. 
Sometimes there is not an observable market price for the liability or entity’s own equity 
instrument. IFRS 13 divides in two possible scenarios: liabilities and equity instruments held or 
not held by other parties as assets.   
 
For the first one, the fair value of the liability or equity instrument follows the same rules to 
measure the FV of an asset – subject further developed in the next sections. Nonetheless, this 
price might be aftermost adjusted according to the features that the asset has and the liability or 
equity instrument does not and the other way around. IASB provides an example: “the observed 
price for an asset reflects a combined price for a package comprising both the amounts due 
from the issuer and a third-party credit enhancement. In such cases, the objective is to estimate 
the fair value of the issuer’s liability, not the price of the combined package.”13 In this specific 
situation the reporting entity should adjust the price in order to eliminate the credit 
enhancement, which is not part of the liability. According to IFRS 13, there are some factors 
which indicate that the quoted price for the asset must be adjusted:  
a) “the quoted price for the asset relates to a similar (but not identical) liability or equity 
instrument held by another party as an asset”14, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 ZYLA, Mark. L, (2010), Fair Value Measurements: Practical Guidance and Implementation 
13 SFAS 157 
14 IFRS 13 – Fair Value Measurements	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b)  “the unit of account for the asset is not the same as for the liability or equity 
instrument”14. 
 
Last but not least, if there is no corresponding asset for a liability it is necessary to estimate the 
price, always in the market participant’s point of view. IASB proposes the present value 
technique or other valuation techniques, further explained and analyzed. To what concerns the 
present value technique it is necessary that the reporting entity estimates the future cash 
outflows that the other entity would incur to fulfill the liability. According to the Exposure Draft 
May 2009, this estimation is done through:  
a) Estimating the cash flows the entity would incur in fulfilling the obligation; 
b) Excluding cash flows, if any, that other market participants would not incur; and 
c) Including cash flows, if any, that other market participants would incur but the entity 
would not incur. 
 
2.3 Valuation Techniques 
 
Valuation techniques are needed to estimate the price of a transaction between the market 
participants at the measurement date. According to FASB, SFAS 157, and IASB, IFRS 13, the 
valuation techniques must be consistent with three of the approaches: market, cost or income. 
There are cases in which a single technique is enough – valuation of an asset with quoted 
market prices – but in other circumstances a multiple valuation technique is needed. In the 
latest, “the results shall be evaluated and weighted, as appropriate, considering the 
reasonableness of the range of values indicated by those results.”15 IFRS 13 states “a fair value 
measurement is the point within that range that is most representative of fair value in the 
circumstances.”16 
 
Following the same standard – IFRS 13 – an entity should use the valuation techniques most 
appropriate for each circumstance, always maximizing the use of observable inputs and 
minimizing the usage of unobservable ones. The choice between the different valuation 
techniques must be well considered, once their usage must be applied consistently. 
Nevertheless, a change in the valuation technique is permitted if it ends up in a better 
representation of the fair value for the circumstances. IFRS 13 gives some examples of events 
where a change might happen, like: 
a) “new markets develop; 
b) new information becomes available; 
c) information previously used is no longer available; 
d) valuation techniques improve; or 
e) market conditions change.” 
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In order of a better understanding a brief description of the three valuation techniques is done in 
the further sections. 
2.3.1 Cost Approach 
 
The Cost Approach has in its basis the concept of current replacement cost, which is “the 
amount that would currently be required to replace the service capacity of an asset17”. It is 
mostly applied to tangible assets such as buildings or equipment, and to intangible assets such 
as customer relationships. Nevertheless, it is difficult to apply to an entire operating business.  
 
To the cost of replacement is subtracted any adjustments for obsolescence. As mention above, 
the first one answers the question: how much would it cost at the measurement date, to replace 
a comparable asset or group of assets? Regarding obsolescence, it includes physical 
deterioration, functional and economic obsolescence, and “is broader than depreciation for 
financial reporting purposes (an allocation of historical cost) or tax purposes (based on specified 
service lives)”17.  
 
2.3.2 Income Approach 
 
The income approach uses valuation techniques to convert “future amounts (e.g. cash flows or 
income and expenses) to a single current (i.e. discounted) amount.”17 The FV measurement of 
these amounts is based on the value designated by current market expectations.  Thanks to its 
nature it can be applied to an entire business or just to a specific asset.  
 
The income approach encompasses several valuation techniques such as present value 
techniques (Discounted Cash Flow), option pricing models (Black-Scholes Model or binomial 
model) and the multi-period excess earnings methods (applied in some intangible assets).   
 
2.3.3 Market Approach 
 
The market approach estimates FV through prices and other relevant information generated by 
market transactions encompassing identical assets or liabilities. Basically, within this approach 
FV is estimated by comparing cash flows, earnings, or other metric of the reporting entity with a 
multiple or other metric of a similar entity whose shares are transacted in the market. Taking 
into consideration its easy nature – its basis is on similar’ transactions – it is a very used 
approach. Nonetheless, it is difficult to apply to intangible assets.  
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Furthermore, market multiples and the matrix pricing are the methodologies consistent with this 
approach. “Multiples might be in ranges with a different multiple for each comparable. The 
selection of the appropriate multiple within the range requires judgment, considering factors 
(qualitative and quantitative) specific to the measurement.”18 To what concerns the matrix 
pricing it is essentially used to evaluate debt securities. The main characteristic of this technique 
is the fact that it does not rely exclusively on quoted market prices, but instead, it considers 
securities’ relationship with benchmarked quotes securities.    
 
2.3.4 Inputs to valuation techniques:  
 
The term input is bettered analyzed in the last years in order to a more detailed guideline 
regarding FV measurement. Basically, inputs encompass all the assumptions that market 
participants would use in order to price an asset or a liability, including risk-related assumptions. 
For instance, to estimate the FV of a debt instrument, an assumption, related to risk, would be 
the yields on similar types of debt instruments.  
 
According to IFRS 13, there are two types of inputs, which definitions are given below: 
a) Observable inputs are the ones developed through market data, “such as publicly 
available information about actual event or transactions”18. These inputs mirror the 
assumptions taken by market participants when pricing as asset or liability.  
b) Unobservable inputs, on the other side, are the ones “for which market data are not 
available and that are developed using the best information available about the 
assumptions that market participants would use when pricing the asset or liability.”18 
 
As mentioned before, the aim of valuation techniques is to maximize the use of relevant 
observable inputs and minimizing the use of the unobservable ones.  
 
2.4 Fair Value Hierarchy 
 
In order to “increase consistency and comparability in fair value measurements and the related 
disclosures”18 it is established a hierarchy where three levels for the inputs are settled and 
prioritized. Level 1 is the one with highest priority and it corresponds to quoted market prices 
(unadjusted) for identical assets and liabilities. On the other extreme is the level 3, which 
corresponds to unobservable inputs and to the lowest priority.  
 
What’s more, there are some situations in which the inputs used to evaluate an asset or liability 
are within different levels. Still, when estimating the FV measurement as a whole is “based on 
the significance of the lowest level of the input”.18 This significance entails judgment because it 
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will have a critical impact on the disclosures about the FV measurement.  
 
2.4.1 Level 1 
	  
Regarding this level, two important topics must be mentioned. The first one relies on the 
definition of active market, which is the one where transactions take place with relevant 
frequency and volume to deliver pricing information on an on-going basis.  
 
A quoted price in an active market is the one where relies the highest priority and it should be 
used whenever it is possible.  
 
Moreover, the second point refers to the three exceptions of what is mentioned above. When an 
entity possesses a portfolio of similar assets, it may happen that it cannot access to their prices 
individually. In this case the reporting entity may opt for another valuation technique, ending up 
in a lower level of the FV hierarchy. Secondly, the situations where unforeseen examples take 
place after the close of the respective market but before the measurement date, which means 
that the FV price is not adjusted to the circumstances of the measuring date. The entity is 
allowed to recognise the effect of these events in the FV measurement. Once again, the other 
methodology elected will end up in a lower level.  Lastly, for measuring the FV of liabilities or 
own entity’s equity instruments based on quoted prices of similar item traded as assets but 
needing adjustments. Like mentioned before, any adjustment ends up in a lower FV level.  
 
2.4.2 Level 2  
 
This level corresponds to all the inputs observable either directly or indirectly to the asset or 
liability which are not quoted prices included in level 1. This includes: quoted prices for similar 
assets or liabilities in active or not-active markets; “inputs other that quoted prices that are 
observable of the asset or liability”19, such as credit risks and default rates; and “market-
corroborated inputs”19. 
Any necessary adjustment of this level will end up once again on decreasing the level.  
 
2.4.3 Level 3 
 
The last level relies on unobservable inputs, consequently imposing little or any market activity. 
Nevertheless the main goal stays the same: estimate an exit price using the best information 
available and the same assumptions as market participants. Any adjustment regarding this level 
is related to the availability of the information between the reporting entity and the market 
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participants.  
2.5 Fair Value and Historical Cost – the current debate 
 
The importance of choosing between different accounting policies relies on the fact that we live 
in an imperfect world. The nature and consequences of the world’s imperfections make 
accounting not only essential but, as well, controversial. A lot of literature discusses the 
necessity of accounting standards throughout the times. In this sense, Fair Value Accounting 
(FVA) is not an exception. If we would live in a perfect world with perfect markets, mark-to-
market prices equalizing accounting values would as well be perfect. Several authors have 
been giving their opinions and some controversialist arose, mainly due to two situations: FVA is 
a much more bold approach than Historical Cost (HC) and several FV standards were launched 
at the peak of the financial crisis. This subsection presents the main arguments of this actual 
debate.  
 
In a nutshell, the major difference between these two policies is that FVA relies on a longer 
extent on market prices, and under HC approach (HCA) the valuation is based on 
historical/original prices, sometimes without subsequent adjustments.  
 
The first advantage of FVA relies precisely on the fact that a balance sheet at observed prices 
shows the reality of the firms in the market place. Thus, investors will have a better 
understanding of the risk profile of each company, which consequently will insert discipline in 
the markets and, therefore, in the overall economy.  
 
Nonetheless, with this first advantage comes the first critic. FVA, instead of just reflecting the 
fundamental value of an asset, it creates an extra endogenous source of volatility. It is important 
to briefly explain this artificial volatility. The usual prices’ volatility refers to the one that purely 
reflects the underlying fundamentals, which it is not the critic point in FVA.  In this case, the 
artificial volatility has its source in the market prices double-edge role. Besides their proper role 
in reflecting the fundamentals value, market prices influence the actions of market participants, 
injecting the so-called artificial volatility that is not justified by the fundamentals.  
 
Furthermore, when firms sell assets massively, market prices decrease “more than it is justified 
by the fundamentals”20 which exercise a negative effect on all other market participants, mainly 
the ones who had chosen to hold the assets. Short-horizon firms that anticipate this scenario 
will sell their assets which ends up amplifying the price fall. This phenomenon is normally called 
endogenous risk or artificial volatility “because it results from a feedback loop created within a 
system”.20 
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On the opposite side, HC, relying on past transaction prices, is insensitive to recent price 
signals which ends up in a bad representation of the value of the assets and in inefficient sales. 
Under HCA, mainly shortsighted firms, try to sell assets that have been recently appreciated in 
value – since booking them at HC understates their worth.  
 
On the one hand, HC results in countercyclical trades that, in the last instance, stabilize prices. 
On the other hand, FVA using current market prices as its basis result in pro-cyclical trades that 
destabilizes prices. In order to a better understanding, an example is presented:  
 under HCA, when price falls (rises) the incentive is to hold (sell) but, on the contrary,  
 under FVA, when price falls (rises) the incentive is to sell (hold).  
 
From this example it is easily understandable that FVA may result in inefficient sales in bad 
times. Nonetheless, HCA seems to be particularly inefficient in good times.  
 
According to Sapra, “proponents of fair value accounting claim that historical cost accounting 
induces managers to engage in gains trading by cherry-picking and selling those assets that 
have appreciated in value (i.e., winners) and holding on to those assets that have lost value 
(i.e., losers).”20 
 
According to Hyon Shin et all, the dilemma is precisely choosing “between ignoring price signals 
or relying on their degraded versions”23: FVA “overcomes the price insensitivity by extracting the 
information conveyed by market prices, but it also distorts this information for illiquid assets 
(such as loans, privately placed bonds and insurance portfolios).”21 
 
From this perspective and taking into consideration the environment where financial institutions 
operate, it is predictable that they were the biggest opponents of the FVA, namely the banking 
sector: loans are part of the assets’ side of a bank balance sheet and they are characterized as 
senior, long-term and very illiquid. These kinds of assets are traded in the so-called over-the-
counter (OTC) market, which is characterized by its low degree of standardization and illiquidity.  
 
Moreover, accounting earnings are important for the banking sector because they are directly 
connected with two topics: managerial compensation and prudential/regulatory ratios. In order 
to maximize expected earnings, the bank must choose between securitizing a loan portfolio, 
before the earnings are reported, or holding the portfolio in the bank’s balance sheet. At the 
same time it would be expectable that banks adjusted required capital when expectations about 
future losses change and not just when they are already realized (capital requirements settled 
by bank regulators are based on expected future losses). 
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Additionally, according to Hin, Hyun Song et all, securitization is also related with the choice of 
an accounting policy. Under the HCA banks or financial institutions only securitize their loan 
portfolio since their books do not reflect the embedded value of their portfolio fast enough.  
Taking into account the price insensitivity of HCA, firms tend to focus just on the short-run, 
which consequently makes them to sell their assets. In this sense, firms simply do not consider 
long run projects that sometimes are even more profitable. Several authors agree that the 
securitization boom had on its basis the HCA.  
 
Another critical point of the FVA relies on the fact that market prices do not always correspond 
to the fundamental values of the assets because of the information publically available. Some 
examples are “transaction costs, limits to arbitrage; market prices may be subject to behavioral 
biases and investors irrationality. A liquid crunch can affect market prices…” 22 Once again, 
there is not an answer to this problem, but instead finding one is the actual problem. HCA does 
not solve it either. Sapra encourages giving additional information in the disclosures. The author 
actually affirms that it is advisable to use market values, even if the markets are illiquid, 
supplementing the market values used with additional disclosures, “e.g., about the fundamental 
value of the asset when held-to-maturity.”23 
 
Before concluding, it is necessary for the next analysis - the recent financial crisis - a deeper 
clarification about the effect of FVA in pro-cyclicality. Laux&Leuz presents two arguments for the 
contribution of the FV to pro-cyclicality: 
i. FVA allows either assets’ write-ups and the increase in banks’ leverage in the booms – 
which ends up transforming the financial system more vulnerable and financial crisis 
even more severe.  
ii. FVA can make contagion in the financial markets – explained earlier.  
 
Nevertheless, HCA does not provide any benefit in these situations. Besides smoothing the 
financial systems with opaque book values, under HCA firms are not allowed to assets write-
ups in the booms and create “hidden” reserves critical in busts. From this point of view FV might 
be, instead of a contributor for the current crisis, a smoother of the gravity of the crisis. 
According to Harris & Kutasovic “A test of the relationship between accounting methodology 
and leverage is ultimately an empirical issue”24 in order to exactly conclude if FV is pro-cyclical 
or not.   
 
According to these authors, FVA is inefficient in busts but HC is particularly inefficient in good 
times. As the assets’ liquidity decreases, FVA becomes more inefficient in comparison with 
HCA, because strategic concerns overcome the fundamental analysis. As the authors mention 
“strategic concerns create pro-cyclical trades that destabilize prices in the mark-to-market 
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regime while strategic concerns result in countercyclical trades that reduce fundamental 
volatility in the historical cost regime.” 25  Moreover, HCA “may dominate FVA when assets have 
long duration, trade in very illiquid market of feature an important downside risk.”27 
 
However, even if it seems that HCA is a better solution for held-to-maturity assets, FV appears 
in the big scenario being advantageous to investors: firstly, these last ones can evaluate past 
decisions in the light of current market prices and; secondly, investors might have some doubts 
regarding the bank’s ability to hold those assets until maturity. 
 
Concluding, on the one hand, FVA provides updated information, increase transparency (few 
defend this point as very important), assures that all price changes appears in the balance 
sheet and encourage prompt corrective actions. On the other hand, FVA it is not relevant for 
long-term assets, specially HTM, it might distort prices by marketing inefficiencies, investors’ 
rationality and liquidity problems, FV based on models is not reliable – level 3 and FVA 
contributes for the pro-cyclicality of the financial system.  
 
The question must be seen as a controversial one and an open debate. To an accurate 
conclusion it must be defined a-priori which assets are being analyzed. For instance, few would 
dare to defend HC for liquid assets but, for others, it is the only solution for loans. Moreover, the 
fact that we face a world with more than one imperfection makes the analysis even more 
subjective. It is really important that all the characteristics and consequences must be well-know 
and studied in order to reach the exact impact of the accounting policy chosen. It is almost 
impossible to please everybody: all types of standards have their pros and cons and their 
specific trade-offs; each trade-off will differ from industry to industry. It is essential that before 
turning down FVA all the alternative options are studied and analyzed because if FV is 
inefficient in some phases, HC is even more in others. 
 
2.6 Application of FV to Financial Instruments 
 
The main focus of this dissertation is the fair value measurement within the financial 
instruments. What’s more, taking into consideration that both agencies, IASB and FASB, are 
walking in the same directions, IASB policies were chosen since the case regards European 
banks and their debt securities.  
 
IASB had published several crucial standards related to financial instruments: IAS 39 Financial 
Instruments: Recognition and Measurement, IAS 32 Financial Instruments: Presentation, IFRS 
9 Financial Instruments and IFRS 7 Financial Instruments: Disclosures, IFRS 13 Fair Value 
Measurement, among others.  
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In this sense, according to IAS 32 “A financial instrument is any contract that gives rise to a 
financial asset of one entity and a financial liability or equity instrument of another entity.”26  
 
IFRS 13 was part of the Memorandum of Understanding signed by both boards. Besides 
increasing transparency with FV measurement, it aims to provide additional information about 
the 3rd level of the hierarchy. According to IASB, “IFRS 13 requires entities to disclose 
information about the valuation techniques and inputs used to measure fair value, as well as 
information about the uncertainty inherent in fair value measurements.” 
 
The main aspects of these standards will be further on developed and analyzed.  
 
2.7 Fair Value Accounting within the recent financial crisis 
 
As mentioned before, the financial sector, namely banks and insurance companies, developed 
some negative opinions regarding FVA. This debate occurred for the last decade but the 
financial sector had notorious voice within the recent financial crisis. According to the banking 
sector, FV contributed to the actual crisis, opposed to the proponents, which believe that FV 
was just a messenger of the bad news. In this section it is presented the impact of FV along the 
crisis, once again giving special attention to the bank sector.  
 
At October 6th of 2008 the world woke up with a completely new reality. All the big stock 
exchanges of the world suffered sharp falls and the panic was installed in the financial markets 
after the U.S. rescue plan was approved. Nonetheless, in the middle of 2007 the crisis could 
already be predicted. As all the other crisis, it came from a boom. The boom in the credit market 
related with the low interest rates applied in the previous decade.  
 
In a nutshell, American market was built on credit, but not in a wisely way. Banks lent money to 
people who would not be able to fulfill its obligation – that is why the well-known expression 
subprime – at a low interest rate and rising house prices, giving the idea that it was a good 
investment. Thus, banks and mortgage brokers borrowed even more money starting a money 
game cycle and creating more securitization. Also, investments banks such as Lehman 
Brothers got into mortgages to securitize them and then resell them again. Some banks even 
started to buy securities from another banks. After all, those loans were incorporated in 
Collateralized Debt Obligations, or CDOs, (even more complex forms of securitization) which 
spread even more the risk but were very complicated and often hid the bad loans.  Banks 
increased their exposure and confidence. After three years with consecutive increases in the 
interest rates, people stopped paying, housing prices fell and the problems arose. The crisis of 
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confidence was settled and banks were facing the situation with the riskiest loans and assets 
were falling so sharply that made lenders to take their money back. There was no certainty 
regarding the value of the loans. The crisis started with some banks collapsing, even the larger 
banks had to request for bailouts from governments.  
 
The first dramatic situation was the action took by the Federal Reserve to prevent Bear 
Stearns’s bankruptcy. After that consecutive events took place: the rescue of Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac which were placed under government control, the insolvency of Lehman Brothers, 
the sale of Merrill Lynch to Bank of America, the 85 billion dollars injection got by American 
International Group (AIG, the biggest insurance company in the world) from the Treasury, 
Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley reconsidered the way of making business, Citigroup 
bought Wachovia Corporation or Washington Mutual was taken over by Morgan Chase are 
some examples.  
 
Thanks to the globalization of the financial system and the importance of the American market 
this crisis quickly spread throughout the world. In Europe a number of nations decided to 
nationalize, or part-nationalize some failing banks in order to restore confidence: Fortis bank 
was partially nationalized, being acquired by BNP Paribas while RBS and Nothern Rock were 
saved from bankruptcy. “European officials decided that bailout packages were needed for the 
banking sector and governments promised to guarantee private savings accounts to prevent 
massive withdrawals.” 27 
 
Last but not least, some people had blamed derivatives for this crisis. It is important to mention 
that, even in the case that banks and financial institutions had chosen to manage risk even with 
more risk until the bubble, these financial instruments are not guilty. Nevertheless, they gave a 
boost to this crisis.  
 
Being cognizant with these facts, the question relies on the accounting system that was being 
used along this financial meltdown – a mixed model combining FVA and HCA. Several experts 
blame FVA for these events. Their main argument is that FV forced the falling of some asset 
prices and their consequent sales. The critical point of the FVA is the 3rd Level of the hierarchy – 
where complex mortgage and derivatives are measured. In this sense, “with illiquid markets 
financial institutions may be forced to take outsized losses by writing down the value of the 
security even if they both have the intent and ability to hold the assets to maturity. The resulting 
lower sale value may be below the security’s value based on its future cash flows.”28  
 
What’s more, opponents blame FV for the huge losses as well as the capital impairment 
affirming that those values do not reflect the intrinsic value of the asset. Once again they point 
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out the pro-cyclicality, mentioned before, which ended up declining the performance reported, 
the deterioration of liquidity and insolvency and also capital raising. The preference from the HC 
during crisis relies simply on the fact that, this accounting policy, allows banks to choose when 
to realize gains and losses and the impairment testing is less strict. The actual problem to them 
is one of the advantages mentioned: the FV’s quickly timely reaction to the market.  
 
According to Harris & Kutasovic, the problems around Level 3 are the following: the first one is 
concerned with the fact that the market value based on the SFAS definition of FV as an exit 
price is lower than the value achieved through internal models, which ended up in the 
recognition of huge losses; secondly, level 3 was much greater than it was expected - “As an 
example in 2007, Morgan Stanley had a ratio of level 3 assets to its Stockholders’ Equity in the 
amount of 250 per cent” and third “these level 3 assets ended up in the portfolio of pension 
funds and in global sovereign wealth funds. ” 29 
 
“Level 3 assets due to their illiquidity and unique nature have no objective value.” These assets 
are not traded in the organized market, which impedes the possibility to ascribe them a market 
value. “Additionally, models cannot be used to value these level 3 assets under FASB 157, so a 
mark-to-model method, which theoretically is the best approach for asset valuation in this case, 
is not allowed.”30 
 
Moreover, and referring Laux&Leuz, European Banks were more resilient to FVA than the 
American ones. Once again there is no fundament in their arguments and “there is empirical 
evidence that European firms are generally less likely to take impairments and appear to 
smooth their earnings more”.31 
 
Another critic question was made along the financial crisis: if there were any implementation 
problems regarding FV standards. Both FASB and IASB are reasonably restrictive to what 
concerns deviations from market prices. The reason behind this decision is the fact that allowing 
deviations would open space for the question: the deviation is because the market prices are 
actually misleading or because managers just affirm so in order to avoid write-downs?  
 
Managers will always have the benefit of having more information than the gatekeepers. A 
study prepared by the IMF in 2008 showed that US banks moved assets to Level 3 as the crisis 
revealed itself. It is possible that US banks did not move enough assets in order to prevent the 
contagion effect mentioned earlier. In this sense, it is important to clarify that the way standards 
allow and force the usage of FVA had an impact on the balance sheet of the financial sector.  
 
Furthermore, another implementation problem might be the litigation risk. Deviation from market 
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prices, as shown in the later section, requires profession judgment. For instance, “it is 
conceivable that a manager is reluctant to use an appropriate model-based fair value that is 
higher than an observable price from a very illiquid market, especially when there is substantial 
down-side risk for the economy or the firm, as there typically is in financial crises.”32 In the 
actual environment, managers weigh personal costs and risks when pondering about 
deviations. Taking in consideration the severe penalties managers might undertake, it is 
understandable that they think and act differently from the investors. Once again, the way 
standards face FV have an impact on the managers’ actions.  
 
Due to the several criticisms and asks to abandon FVA, SEC prepared a study in detail the role 
of FV in the crisis. The study was consolidated in a report published at the end of 2008 in which 
the continuity of the FVA was encouraged. In this report some surprising conclusions were 
pointed out like the fact that just half of the assets (and even less for the liabilities) were 
measured at FV, and this percentage fell for measurements of FV through profit or loss. 
According to this study, FV increases transparency and provide better decision making for 
investors. Furthermore, it clearly states that the guilty in the crisis were the poor assets’ quality, 
consecutive credit losses, and lack of investors’ confidence.  
 
Once again referring Harris & Kutasovic, the implementation of FV in 2008 was not the trigger of 
this financial crisis. But on the contrary it “is a step in the right direction in that it provides a 
measure that best reflects a financial institution’s current financial condition by providing 
meaningful and transparent financial information and minimizing the possibility of 
manipulation.”35 These authors go further and also affirm that eliminating the FV as the 
opponents wanted would “have increased market instability and would have made the financial 
crisis worse.”33 Finally, they blame lack of business judgment, poor credit policies and internal 
controls and crisis of confidence for the financial meltdown lived.  
 
Moreover, some advocates of FVA, such as Moyer Liz, stated that FV warns companies to stay 
as far as possible from the most volatile assets once it brings volatility and quickness to daily 
accounts. Moreover, they also advise to avoid instruments with no active market.  
 
From this crisis and all the recent and open debate some conclusions and actions must be 
mentioned. First, the main conclusion regarding the sector in analysis relies on the fact that, 
considering the actual scenario, it will be a better idea to adjust banking regulation instead of 
the accounting system. The excessive use of complex derivatives traded in the OTC market 
ended up in lack of transparency and confidence.  
 
Secondly, IASB and FASB during 2009 had created a Financial Crisis Advisory Group (FCAG) 
with the aim of studying and proving the necessary help to establish confidence again and 
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improve the information and methodologies for firms to follow the standards. In their first report 
published, the co-chair of FCAG says, “Accounting was not the root cause of the financial crisis, 
but it has an important role to play in its resolution.” 34  
 
Third, investors as opposed to the banking sector prefer FVA and stand for it. A study from 
FASB showed that during the crisis the assets affected were trade below their book value. This 
proposes that investors perceive the net asset of banks as overstated and not understated as 
the opponents stated. Furthermore, another study by KPMG in 2007 suggests that in the 
beginning of the crisis European banks increased their disclosures about financial instruments. 
Once again, the option for more detailed and mandatory disclosures could support the reassure 
this lack of confidence.   
 
Last but not least, it can be concluded that FV did not contribute to this crisis, but on the 
contrary, it provides warnings and it was a messenger of the bad news. Likewise, it struggles 
the opacity of banks’ book values.  
 
2.8 Financial Crisis in Europe – The Sovereign Debt Crisis 
 
The Sovereign Debt crisis in Europe had its origin in the end of 2009 and it is in part a fiscal 
crisis. Several countries, such as Greece, had spent more than they could collect with taxes. In 
this sense, they had to borrow more debt in order to finance their countries. After the American 
bubble, and as mentioned before, the European financial system was very fragile. Moreover, 
Governments in order to prevent their banking sector collapse injected huge amounts of money. 
 
The trigger event was the announcement of the duplication of Greek’s Public Deficit. In 2009, 
deficit was 6,7% of its GDP and it was reviewed to 15,4% of its GDP. Also the expectative 
regarding its Sovereign Debt was more than 115% of the GDP. The debt problem was further 
compounded by the fact that foreign institutions, particularly foreign banks, held almost three-
fourths of the government debt. Not only was the high fiscal deficit a problem, it was also 
camouflaged by derivative hedging. Consequently, the entire world put its eyes in Europe and 
the possibility of Greece’s default startled investors. 
 
Furthermore, the financial assets of peripheral countries of the Eurozone suffered a remarkable 
pressure, particularly with the significant rise in sovereign spreads and significant declines in 
their respective stock exchanges. From February 2010 on, a strong pressure was made to 
Greek Financial assets. Also, investors became extremely sensitive to any news about 
the Eurozone economies, which were the most vulnerable to the level of public accounts. These 
economies became speculation targets by the market, creating a contagion effect. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 FCGA Press Release dated 28 July 2009, www.fasb.org/fcag.org	  
Fair Value Dissertation     29	  
Consequently, the major rating agencies followed market concerns and carried out 
consecutives downgrading in sovereign debt of those countries, which was obviously followed 
by negative effects and consequences for the rating of their financial institutions and financing 
conditions of the peripheral European countries. 
 
Starting in April 2010 with the Greek ask for a bailout package and with Moody’s downgrade to 
“junk” Greek Sovereign Debt, the systemic events succeed in Europe establishing the alarm in 
the market. In that month, IMF and ECB agreed in a 110 billion of Euros bailout package to 
Greece and several austerity measures were applied in the country. The contagion effect 
started to be felt in the Eurozone. In June 2010, the euro closed with the lowest rate of 
exchange since 2006, with 1,2271$ against the US dollar, according to “Banco de Portugal”. 
 
The crisis was settled. Ireland was the first country, after Greece, asking Troika (the committee 
composed of IMF, European Commission and European Central Bank) for help. Irish crisis is 
not related with bad public policies but it is indeed a bank collapse – related to a real estate 
bubble. Two years before Ireland’s collapse, its rating was AAA, the highest rating, and from 
this summer on Moody’s downgraded it to “junk” (Ba1). The ratings for the peripheral countries 
are presented in Figure 1, below.  
 
 
Figure 1 – Evolution of Ratings for European countries for the four years 
 
At the begging of 2011, European finance ministers created the European Stability mechanism, 
which is a permanent fund of 500 million of Euros to lend to European countries in the last 
instance. The peripheral economies were starting to give signals of financial struggle.  
 
In May 2011, Portugal asked for help, once again to Troika. A bailout package of 78 billion of 
euros was decided to this country. Austerity measurements from the government were applied 
as on the other countries. 
 
In June 2011, Standard & Poor’s downgraded the Greek rating to CCC, which was an historical 
record once it was the lowest rating given to sovereign debt. 
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At July 2011, a second bailout package is agreed to Greece. This time the amount was 109 
billion of Euros and it involved the private sector. The rumors about Greece leaving the 
Eurozone started and by August 2011, the European Commission President, José Manuel 
Barroso, came to public with concerns about the spreading of the crisis beyond the peripheral 
countries. In this month, the interest rates on 10-years Italian government bonds toped 6 per 
cent as it debt/GDP ratio reaches 120%. Italy started to have internal problems encompassing 
the resignation of the Prime Minister. Spain changed the ruling political party in November 2011 
and clear signs of financial difficulties were seen. By this time, the financial crisis had reached 
the third and fourth largest European economies.  
 
At the year-end, European leaders had meet in Brussels to discuss the Sovereign Debt crisis. 
January 2012 started with a downgrade from Standard &Poor’s to eight European countries, 
including France. This downgrade was justified with the impossibility of the euro leaders to deal 
with the crisis. At the end of the month a “fiscal pact” is finally signed between 25 of the 27 
European countries. According to BBC, in just two months ECB had loaned over one trillion to 
private European banks in order to increase liquidity. European markets were struggling and 
there was no sign of enhancements. 
 
Finally, in March 2012, after having amassed a large percentage of private creditors who hold 
Greek Sovereign Debt, the Hellenic government secured the partially forgiveness of the national 
debt. This meant a debt restructuring of approximately 75% (including the principal, around 
50%, plus accrued interests), which rose a forgiveness total amount of around 107 billion euros. 
It was considered the biggest failure of sovereign debt repayment ever. 
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3.  Principles and Practices 
 
The main goal of this chapter is to clarify the main characteristics and principles established by 
the Accounting Standards used in this dissertation analysis: IAS 32, IAS 39, IFRS 7 and IFRS 9. 
The reason behind these three norms is explained by the objectives of each one:  
• The objective IAS 32 is establishing principles for presenting financial instruments as 
liabilities or equity and for offsetting financial assets and financial liabilities. 
• The objective of IAS 39 is to launch principles to recognize and measure financial 
assets and liabilities. 
• Last but not least, IFRS 7 provides information about disclosing financial instruments.  
  
To what concerns IAS 32, Financial Instruments: Presentation, its aim is to prescribe principles 
for classifying financial instruments and for offsetting financial assets and liabilities.  
 
Following this norm, Paragraph 11 gives the definition of a “Financial Asset” and a “Financial 
Liability”. Due to the main topic of this dissertation the definition of “Financial Asset” is 
described. In this sense, a financial asset can be any asset that is:  
a) “cash; 
b) An equity instrument of another entity; 
c) A contractual right:  
i. To receive cash or another financial asset from another entity; or 
ii. To exchange financial assets or financial liabilities with another entity under 
conditions that are potentially favourable to the entity; or 
d) A contract that will or may be settled in the entity’s own equity instruments (…)” 
 
Regarding IAS 39 “Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement”, its aim is to establish 
principles for recognizing, derecognizing and measuring financial assets and liabilities. 
 
Firstly, this norm states that all financial assets and liabilities, including derivatives and certain 
embedded derivatives, must be recognized in the financial position’s statement. Secondly, all 
financial instruments are initially measured at fair value on the date of the acquisition; normally 
this amount coincides with the cost. Moreover, the only difference among different financial 
instruments is exclusion or not of the transaction costs.  
 
Furthermore, IAS 39 defines how to measure a financial asset subsequent to initial recognition, 
according to four categories:  
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I. Loans and Receivables - non-derivative financial assets with fixed or 
determined payments that are not quoted in an active market.  
II. Held-to-maturity investments – non-derivative financial assets with fixed or 
determined payments and fixed maturity that an entity has the intention to hold 
until maturity. 
III. Financial Assets measured at Fair Value through Profit or Loss – this category 
includes financial assets held for trading (short-term profit taking) and any other 
financial asset that the entity designates, “the fair value option”. Derivative 
assets are always in this category unless they are designated in an effective 
hedging relationship.  
Financial assets designated by the entity at fair value through profit or loss 
upon initial recognition must meet at least one of the following criteria:  
i. The fair value option “eliminates an accounting mismatch that 
would otherwise arise from measuring assets or liabilities or 
recognizing the gains or losses on them on different bases”; 
ii. Those that are part of a group of financial assets, financial 
liabilities, or both that are managed, and their performance is 
evaluated by management on a fair value basis in accordance 
with a documented risk management or investment strategy 
iii. Those that contain one or more embedded derivatives.  
 
IV. Available-for-Sale – all financial assets that do not fall into the other categories.  
 
To what concerns measurement between the categories, the first ones (“Loans and 
Receivables” and “Held-to-maturity”) are carried at amortized cost, subject to a test for 
impairment. Regarding Financial Assets fair valued through profit or loss, as the name 
indicates, are measured at fair value, with value changes recognized in profit or loss. Last but 
not least, Available-for-Sale Financial Assets are measured at fair value and value changes 
recognized in other comprehensive income apart from impairment, interest recognized using the 
effective interest method and for monetary items, foreign exchange gains and losses. If the fair 
value cannot be measured reliably the asset is carried at cost subject to impairment.   
 
The next topic which must be mentioned in the context of this dissertation is the 
“Reclassifications”. IAS 39 defines clearly in which circumstances an asset can be reclassified. 
In this sense, reclassifications for non-derivative assets allowed by this norm are:  
 
 Reclassification from “Financial Asset at Fair Value through Profit & Loss” when the 
assets are not held any more with the purpose of sell in a near future into “Loans and 
Receivables” if the asset being reclassified has the characteristics defined from this 
caption or if the entity has the ability and intention to hold the asset for a foreseeable 
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future or until maturity. What’s more, reclassifications for another category are just 
allowed under exceptional circumstances, which justify the respective incorporation. 
 Reclassification from “Available-for-Sale” to “Loans and Receivables” when the entity 
has the intention and ability to held the asset for a foreseeable future, and under rare 
circumstances.   
 
Ultimately, IAS 39 elucidates about “Impairment”. An entity must report at the end of each year 
the intention to impair a financial asset. According to this norm “a financial asset or a group of 
financial assets is impaired and impairment losses are incurred if, and only if, there is objective 
evidence of impairment as a result of one or more events that occurred after the initial 
recognition of the asset and that loss event has an impact on the estimated future cash flows of 
the financial asset or group of financial assets”.35  
 
Moreover, the loss events are defined, which can be financial difficulties from the issuer, 
disappearance of an active market for a specific financial asset, breaches of contracts, etc. 
Additionally it is fully explained for each type of asset how to measure and recognize the 
impairment. The most important caption to mention is “Available-for-Sale”. As it was mentioned, 
value changes are recognized in equity. Nonetheless, when there is objective evidence that the 
asset is impaired, the cumulative loss shall be reclassified from equity to profit or loss even if 
the financial asset has not been derecognized. The amount of the cumulative loss removed 
from equity to P&L shall be the difference between the acquisition cost (net of amortization) and 
the current fair value.  
 
To what concerns IFRS 9 – Financial Instruments, in 2009 IASB had issued it, which will 
ultimately substitute IAS 39. This standard will be mandatory from 2015 on and the main 
differences to IAS 39 are concerned with financial assets classification. Instead of the four 
categories explained above, IFRS 9 just considers two categories from financial assets: 
amortized cost and fair value. In May 2012 the IASB has introduced a new category for debt 
financial assets – the so called “Fair Value through Other Comprehensive Income” (“FVTOCI”). 
The IASB has decided that interest income arising out from this category would be recognized 
using the effective interest method and credit impairment losses would be recognized in profit or 
loss using the same methodology as those instruments measured at amortized cost. The IASB 
also tentatively decided that the cumulative fair value gains and losses recognized in other 
comprehensive income would be recycled to profit or loss upon derecognition. 
 
Finally, IFRS 7 – “Financial Instruments: Disclosures” aims to prescribe disclosures that enable 
financial statement users to evaluate the significance of financial instruments to an entity, the 
nature and extent of their risks, and how the entity manages those risks. In a nutshell, this norm 
requires disclosure of information about the significance of financial instruments for an entity’s 
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financial position and performance and about the nature and extent of risks arising from 
financial instruments. 
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4. Industry analysis - The French Banking Sector  
 
 
France is the world’s fifth largest economy and the second largest economy of Europe, 
measured in GDP. The financial sector embodies a strong influence in this country. According 
to Fédération Bancaire Française (FBF), France presented, in 2011, 425 banks with nearly 
39.000 branches in the country. According to the same source, the French banking sector 
represent 3% of the GDP over the last ten years and 1,6% of the national workforce. 
 
The French banking sector is one of the biggest private-sector employers in France, for 
instance, in 2011 the banking sector employed around 37.000 people. Another indicator of the 
strengthen of French banks are their weight in the market capitalization of Paris. The financial 
sector represented around 13%, in 2011, of the Cotation Assistée en Continu 40 (CAC40 – 
which is a French stock market benchmark that includes the forty biggest companies from 
EuroNext Paris - Exhibit 4). This sector had presented a significant growth, with a compound 
annual growth rate (CAGR) of 4,2% between 2007 and 2011. Nevertheless, it is expected, due 
to the European crisis, a deceleration with an estimated CAGR of 3,1% for the next five years – 
2011 until 2016.  
 
The main business line is the Retail Banking, which had accounted for almost 50% of the 
French Banks revenues in 201136. Retail Baking is followed by Investment Banking activity and 
in third place Asset Management, which is suffering a reduction due to the actual crisis. 
Regarding sectors, the most lucrative one is the credit one which had represented in 2011 
around 44,4% of the industry’s overall value.  
 
The French banking sector is extremely supervised and regulated. The main entities are the 
following: 
 
• Autorité de Contrôle Prudentiel (ACP); 
• Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF); 
• Minister of the Economy; 
• Comité des établissements de credit et des enterprises d’investissement (Credit 
Institutions and Investment Firms Committee) (CECEI); 
• La Commission Bancaire (The Banking Commission). 
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4.1 The major players in the French Banking Sector 
 
The French banking sector is very concentrated, with the four banks counting for more than 
80% of the market – See Figure 2 – Major players. A briefly presentation of this sector is done 
above, based on a historical five years’ analysis of the Net Banking Income and the Net Income 
of the major players.  
 
 
Figure 2 - Major Players in the French Banking Sector  
 
In a nutshell, the Net Banking Income (NBI) is the banks specific indicator that shows the 
specific contribution of banks to increasing national wealth. Hence, it is equivalent of the added 
value for non-financial activities. This indicator is the difference between interest and 
commission received and paid, the operational income less operational expenditure, plus gains 
and losses on financials instruments. In this sense, NBI shows a clearly the situation before 
considering general operating costs, provisions for unpaid amounts and one-off items and 
taxes. Beneath are presented the evolution of NBI and Net Income for the major French players 
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Figure 3 - Net Banking Income for the major French banks in the last five years 
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Figure 4 - Net Income for the French major banks for last the last five years (in billion of Euros) 
 
In general it can be observed that French banks had suffered a slowdown during the last year. 
The main factor is the European Sovereign Debt crisis, affecting these banks because of their 
exposure or external presence. The second factor is the costs with the prudential regulations, 
both Basel II and III, which required more capital and a reduction of banks’ balance sheets.   
 
Firstly, BNP Paribas presented the highest NBI and NI and, it is as well the largest bank in 
France. Do notice that in average BNP’s NBI almost doubles the NBI of its competitors and 
triples regarding the NI. According to the bank financial statements, the decreased presented in 
2011 is due to the slowdown in the banking and investment services.  
 
Secondly, Crédit Agricole (CA) with a market share of 23%, presented an increase in its NBI, 
nevertheless suffered a sharply decrease in its NI, from €3.611 to €812 million. The increase in 
the NBI refers to the enlargement of the CA’s retail network in France.  
 
At third place, Société Generale presents a market-share of 18% and a NBI of around €25.636 
million. The reduction in both indicators is due to the economic slowdown of the current crisis. 
 
The Group BPCE is the second largest group in France and it was founded in 2009 by the 
merger CNCE (Caisse Nationale des caisses d’Épargne) and Banque Fédérale des Banques 
Populaires. It had shown the ability to maintain its NBI in the last two years due, once again, 
due its large network of branches.  
 
A detailed description is made for three banks: BNP Paribas, Société Générale and Crédit 
Agricole which are the ones analyzed in the case discussion of this dissertation. The next table 
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(Table 1) presents the general features of these banks. Moreover, the consolidated financial 
statements, for the next four years, are presented in Exhibits 6-11. 
 
 
Table 1 - General features of the three analysed banks 
 
The next sections briefly present the main banking indicators.  
 
4.1.1 Earnings-per-share (EPS) and Dividends-per-Share (DPS) 
The next two graphics (Figure 5 and Figure 6) show the evolution of EPs and DPS for the three 
banks. As it can be observed, the three banks undergone through a slowdown in the past year. 
Do notice that CA’s EPS reached negative values in 2011. Regarding DPS, the only bank which 
had distributed dividends in the last year was BNP Paribas.  
 
 
Figure 5 - Evolution of EPS for SG, BNP and CA 
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Figure 7 - Evolution of the Share prices for SG, BNP and CA 
 
The graph above (Figure 7) shows the evolution of the shares prices for the last three years. 
Once again the better performance of BNP Paribas can be concluded. According to the 
indicators presented, CA was the bank, which faced major difficulties in the last years. The 
three banks are transacted in EuroNext Paris.  
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4.1.3 Ratings  
 
The crisis had a negative influence in the ratings of the three banks. As it can be seen, all were 
downgraded along the year of 2011, and SG had a negative look in the beginning of 2012 – See 
Tables 2 and 3.  
 
 
Table 2 - Ratings as at 31.12.2011 
 
Table 3 - Ratings as at 31.12.2010 
 
4.1.4 Core Tier 1  
 
The Core Tier 1 ratio is the core ratio for the banking sector. This solvency ratio is related with 
the Shareholders’ Equity accounting concept. The only difference is that it includes more items 
than the Equity Shareholders. According to European Banking Authority (EBA) it encompasses 
the highest quality assets and hybrid instruments provided by governments.  
 
The Core Tier 1, according to Basel 2.5, for the three banks in analysis is presented below 
(Figure 8).  
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Figure 8 - Evolution of CT1 for SG, BNP and CA (in %) 
 
In general, the Core Tier 1 had been increasing for the last four years. Exhibit 5 shows a briefly 
description of the Tier one values and the Risk-Weight-Assets for the three banks.  
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5. Case Study 
 
The main goal of this dissertation is to analyze the measurement of Greek Sovereign Debt used 
by the three most exposed French banks. Additionally, depending on the measurement applied 
it is analyzed the diverse consequent impacts.  
 
At first a brief description about Greek’s economic and financial situation is presented. 
Secondly, an approach about the support plan for this country is taken. At last, the three banks 
are analyzed: a description of their assets is done, which will look closely to the two major 
captions measured at Fair Value: Available-for-Sale (AFS) Financial Assets and Financial 
Assets at Fair Value through Profit&Loss. For the last bank analyzed, Société Générale, a brief 
presentation of the Held-to-Maturity caption is done as well, due to the fact that this bank has 
Greek Debt within it. 
 
5.1 Greece – Economic and financial situation 
 
Greece had always experienced problems with public debt accompanied with massive 
manifestations and complains from its citizens: since its independence in 1832, it had spent 
more than half of its years in default37. Since 2002, after the implementation of the Euro as a 
common currency between Eurozone’s countries, Greece presented one of the highest growth 
rates in almost all its sectors. The opportunity to borrow money at better conditions prompted 
the actual crisis. In fact, since the Euro implementation came to public as a possibility, the yield 
of 10-year Greek Bonds dropped around 18 percentage points (from 24,5% to 6,5%) between 
1997 and 1999.38 At the same time, the implementation of the Euro had raised markets’ 
confidence, mainly due to the fact that Maastricht Treaty settled the convergence criteria, where 
government deficit (3% of the GDP) and government debt (60% of the GDP) were strictly 
controlled.  
 
Nonetheless, this convergence criterion was not respected by the consecutives Greek 
Governments, along with poor fiscal policies, exacerbated spending associated with complex 
hedging collapsed with the world financial crisis of 2008-09. At this time, Greece became the 
center of attention in Europe. As mentioned in previous sections, in 2009 the Greek Prime 
Minister came public and affirmed that public deficit was under-reported for 2009, several 
numbers were announced during that year, ending in a sharp adjustment from a formerly 
estimation of 5% to a shocking 15,4% of the GDP– this last number revised and announced by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 “Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly, Princeton, 2009” 
38 Global Financial Data	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Eurostat.  In the figure presented below – Figure 9 – it can be seen the Greek Debt percentage 
in comparison with the other Eurozone countries, showing a superior amount for 2010 of about 
58%. 
 
Figure 9 – Greek Debt in comparison to Eurozone average 
	  
Greek’s default started to become a possibility, which would have a huge impact in the 
European and worldwide markets’. Investors lost confidence in European markets, struggling 
some countries such as Portugal, Portugal, Spain and Italy – the last two are the fourth and 
third bigger economies of Europe. 
 
In May 2010, when the 10-year Government Bonds reached 13,688% in the secondary market 
(See Figure 10 and 11), Greece asked for a bailout plan. The ECB and the IMF agreed in a 
€110 billion package alongside with severe austerity measures: deep cut in public expenditures, 
tax increases, economic reform changing mainly the Greek’s pension reforms which were one 
of the most generous of Europe, the health care system and so on. At this time, this package 
aimed to reduce public deficit to 3% of the GDP by 2014. 
 
Standard & Poor’s downgraded Greek Debt to BB+, which corresponds to “junk”. This notice 
had deteriorated European markets. Both Fitch and Moody’s followed the downgrade for Greek 
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Government Bonds. According to the Financial Times, after the downgrading ten-year bonds 
yield reached 15,3%.  
  
	  
Figure	  10	  -­‐	  10	  year	  Greek	  Government	  Bond	  -­‐	  secondary	  market	  rate	  (yield)	  FYs	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Figure	  11	  -­‐	  10	  year	  Greek	  Government	  Bond	  -­‐	  secondary	  market	  rate	  (yield)	  FY	  2011	  
Furthermore, during the summer of 2010, it was created by the 27 Euro member states a 
special and specific vehicle to help European Sovereign Debt Crisis, the European Financial 
Stability Facility, hence forth EFSF. EFSF can issue bonds or other debt securities and initially 
could borrow up to 440 million of Euros. Nevertheless, it suffered an enlargement on July 2011 
to 780 million of Euros.   
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ECB had played a major role in this year. For the first time, this institution bought government 
bonds in the secondary market in order to restore confidence and reduce the systemic 
contagion throughout the Eurozone countries. A disordered default must be avoided.  
 
Early in 2011, it was understood that Greek economy was not recovering. In July 2011, a 
second package of €109 billion was announced with lower interest rates and longer maturities 
for Greek loans. This second package involved better conditions and financial assistance and 
as well as a debt relief of about €50 billion. In this sense, private bondholders would enter 
voluntarily on bond exchanges and rollovers, and debt buybacks in order to decrease Greek 
debt in the short-term. The ones who accepted would write-down the net present value of their 
bonds in 21% (assuming 9% of interest rate), which mature until 31st December 2020. As a 
consequence, the three main credit ratings agencies cut Greece's rating to a level associated 
with “substantial risk of default.” 
 
Nevertheless, this debt relief never really happened. In 26th October, more measures were 
announced. At this date, European Leaders decided for another voluntary bond exchange with 
50% on notional Greek debt held by private investors. The objective was to reach a debt-to-
GDP ratio of 120% in 2020. Moreover, Eurozone states compromised to enter with more €30 
billion, and the promise to stand ready to reinforce if necessary up to €100 billion.  
 
This second package imposed more austerity measures which were not well received among 
Greek citizens. The Prime Minister faced with consecutive strikes, inclusive a 24 hours one, 
announced a referendum. After a strong criticism, he revoked it and resigned.  On the 9th 
November of 2011 a government of national unity was formed and Lucas Papademos, ex-vice 
president of BCE, became interim prime minister until the elections for this year, 2012, were 
scheduled. At this time, the projections of the European Commission pointed that Greek Debt-
to-GDP ratio would be around 198,3% for 2011 and 198,5% for 2012. In the middle of 
November, the negotiations with the private sector, regarding a relief of 50%, started again. 
Nevertheless, these negotiations and the sixth and last parcel of the first support plan took 
months to really take place.  
 
Nevertheless, just on the 21st of February, seven months after the first meeting, the Euro 
leaders decided for a second bailout package of €237 billion for Greece. This consisted of a 
€130 billion of state aid packaged and private sector accepted a nominal haircut amounting 
53,5%, bonds currently held. This value means a debt relief of 107.000 million of euros. In this 
sense, Greece would reach a debt ratio of 120,5% in 2020 as opposed to around 160% along 
2011.  
 
This agreement happened based on four pillars:  
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1. For each bond held a haircut of 53,5% of the NPV. Among the remaining 46,5%,  31,5% 
would be exchanged for 20 bonds issued by Greece with maturities of between 11 and 
30 years guaranteed by EFSF, and 15% with be redeemed immediately in the form of 
EFSF’s short term securities. 
2. The coupon on new bonds will be 2% from 2012 to 2015, rising to 3% from 2015 to 
2020 and 4,3% until 2042.  
3. Accrued interest on the exchanged Greek debt, up to the date of the exchange, will be 
settled through the issue of short-term EFSF securities.  
4. Each new bond issued by Greece will be accompanied by a security linked to 
movements in Greece’s GDP over and above those expected in the plan.  
 
On March 2012, the final agreement was established between the Greek Government, private-
sector creditors and the Euro Group.  
 
5.2 The choice of BNP Paribas, Société Générale and Crédit Agricole 
 
According to the “Quarterly Review, June 2010” issued by the Bank of International Settlements 
(BIS) French and German banks stand for almost $900 billion, in absolute terms, of Portugal, 
Greece and Spain sovereign exposure. Looking closely to the Greek Debt, table 4 shows clearly 
that France was the most exposed country. 39 
 
 
Table 4 - Countries most exposed to Greek Sovereign Debt 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 The  countries that report data to BIS are: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Chile, India, 
Japan, United States, Chinese Taipei, Singapore 
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In order to a deep analysis, the table presented in Exhibit 1 shows the results of a survey done 
by Barclays Capital regarding the top forty holders of Greek Government bonds and Greek 
Debt.  
 
Moreover, as explained in the previous section BNP, SG and CA are the three biggest banks by 
market value in France and also known as the pillars of the French banking sector. These three 
banks had been suffering the consequences of the Greek crisis and instability. (See Exhibit 3) 
During 2011 Moody’s had put the three banks on review and in December had cut their credit 
ratings. BNP and CA had seen their long-term debt cut to Aa3 and SG to A1. According to 
Moody’s the main risks were: for CA the fact that holds a local unit – Emporiki Bank of Greece; 
SG had a large stake in General Bank of Greece and BNP holds a great amount of Greek 
Sovereign Debt. 40 At December 2011, BNP fell 35% SG 53% and CA 52% in the Euro Next 
Paris.  
 
In this sense, the final goal is to analyze and compare the different approaches chosen by these 
three banks and conclude about the impacts of the losses accepted in the overall performance 
of the banks.  
 
5.3 Treatment of Greek Government Bonds  
 
The next section presents a breakdown of the assets from these financial institutions as well as 
how they treated Greek Government Bonds in the accounting perspective.  
 
5.3.1 Crédit Agricole  
 
CA’s Assets totaled 1.723.608 million of euros as at December 31st, 2011, in line with the 
amount recorded in December 2010.  
 
Firstly, it is presented a brief description of the Company’s assets, Table 5, then the main 
captions, and finally the treatment of Government Bonds, specifically the Greek Bonds.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Bloomberg - Biggest French Banks Said Poised to Be Downgraded by Moody’s 
	  
Fair Value Dissertation     48	  
 
Table 5 – Total Assets of Crédit Agricole 
Crédite Agricole’s Assets: 
 
As it can be seen, the caption Financial Assets at Fair Value through Profit&Loss represents 
28% of the total assets of the caption. Furthermore, it is divided in two sub-captions: Financial 
Assets held for trading, which represents 9% of this caption and Financial Assets designated at 
fair value through Profit & Loss upon initial recognition, representing 90%.  
 
To what concerns Available for Sale Financial Assets, it represents around 13% of CA’s Assets. 
According to the group’s policy, Available for Sale embodies most of the sovereign exposure. 
This caption is described beneath in table 6.  
  
 
Table 6 - Available for Sale Financial Assets 
 “Bonds and other fixed-income securities” is the main sub caption, representing around 65% of 
the Available for Sale Financial Assets, a percentage which had increased 15% in comparison 
with the previous year.  
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The gains and losses on Available for sale Financial Assets includes the reclassification of a 
Sovereign Debt portfolio into Held-to-maturity for which a sale of €2.991 million is planned. “This 
reclassification took place following a decision made as part of the group’s willingness to 
alleviate the burden of Sovereign Debt on the balance sheet for which a significant lowering of 
the long-term rating was recognized after the acquisition date.”  
 
According to the consolidated financial statements from 2011 the assets were value at 
amortized cost before the transaction. At the transfer date, assets were valued at fair value and 
the difference was recognized directly in recyclable equity, in the amount of €-316 million.  
  
 
Crédite Agricole’s Fair Value hierarchy breakdown: 
 
Table 7 shows the breakdown by the three levels of the Fair Value’s hierarchy for all the 
financial instruments held by the group.  
 
Table 7 – Breakdown of the Assets through Fair Value’s hierarchy 
  
As it can be seen, the majority of financial assets are valued according to Level 2 (61%). 
Additionally, 37% are valued according to quoted market prices and just 2,1% are valued 
through internal models. Nevertheless, the Greek Government Bonds are part of this small 
percentage, as it will be analyzed further on.   
 
Crédite Agricole’s Sovereign Exposure: 
 
Regarding CA’s sovereign exposure, it is presented beneath the numbers related to the 
countries undertaking support plans or financial difficulties in Eurozone.  
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Table 8 – Crédit Agricole’s Sovereign Exposure to European countries suffering financial 
difficulties  
 
As it can be observed (Table 8), CA’s exposure to Greece had decreased more than a half from 
2010 (4,6%) to 2011(2,2%). Furthermore, the entire sovereign exposure to these countries had 
sharply decreased from 14.182€ to 4.676€, around -203%. 
 
Moreover, and to a better understanding, at first it is presented the actions reported at 30th June, 
at the time of the support plan dated 21st July, and at least the actions and decisions for the final 
reporting of 2011.  
 
At 30th June, the valuation methodology for the Greek government bonds was divided in three 
different groups.   
 
• The first group refers to the securities that mature before 31 December of 2020. In this 
specific case and because they are covered by the support plan, the valuation model 
was based on a 21% discount of the nominal value of the securities for which they are 
substituted. According to 1H2011, the net exposure was of 269 million of Euros, and 
this discount represents the loss accepted by the bank and its renounce to contractual 
cash flows. The impact in the shareholder’s equity was of €136 million.  
Moreover, the impairment recognised in Cost of Risk is divided in two amounts: 
impairment recognized on Greek Government Bonds classified as “Available-for-Sale” 
totalled -€173 million and classified as Held-to-maturity amounted to -€29 million.  
 
• The second group of Greek securities are the ones with a maturity date superior than 
December 2020, totalling €6 million, which are not included in the support plan. For 
these last ones an internal valuation model was applied using non-observable inputs 
and market components. These securities were not subject to impairment because CA 
group had no assurance that the recovery of the future cash flows is going to be 
successful. In this sense, the unrealised loss (after tax and after life insurance 
policyholders’ participation in profits) is recognised directly in Other Comprehensive 
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Income with the amount of €118 million. The impact in the shareholder’s equity was of 
€23 million. 
• The last group included the bonds held by the group in the trading book sub caption that 
are characterized by its low maturity – inferior to six months – that continues to be 
measured according to quoted market prices. The net exposure of CA in the trading 
book amounts €51 million. These types of bonds are not subject of analysis in this 
dissertation due to their maturity and low amount.  
 
As at 31st December, the overall gross exposure of CA regarding Greece reduced to €112 
million from €330 million at 30th June, in the banking activity. To what concerns the insurance 
activity the reduction was from €4.974 million to €1.890 million, from 30th June until 31st 
December; nonetheless this activity is not analysed in this dissertation.  
 
As mentioned before, except for Bonds in the trading book, all Greek government bonds were 
classified according to Level 3, internal models. The valuation methodology was based 30% in 
weighting market prices at 31st December and 70% based on macroeconomic assumptions 
such as Debt/GDP ratio, privatisation programme, performance, etc. The result was a reduction 
of around 74% heedlessly securities’ maturity.  
 
The next table (Table 9) shows all the changes since 30th June until the end of the year to what 
concerns Greek Sovereign Exposure. (Exhibit 2 shows the table presented in the Consolidated 




As it can be seen the only caption embodying Greek Sovereign Exposure at 31st December is 
“Available-for-Sale Financial Assets”. Moreover, trading book is reduced just to €1 million with a 
maturity of one year.  
 
In the year-end financial figures, €1.326 million is the amount recorded under the Cost of Risk 
related to the impairment of Greek Government Bonds. This amount is divided in two sub 
categories: impairment recognized from the Available-for-Sale Financial Assets of €1.136 
million, and €190 million of impairment from the reclassification from Held-to-Maturity to 
Available-for-Sale Financial Assets.  
 
Table	  9	  –	  Greek	  Sovereign	  Exposure’s	  Changes	  from	  30th	  June	  until	  31st	  December	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Additionally, it must be mentioned the fact that Crédit Agricole possesses Emporiki Bank, a 
Greek Bank, which had suffered difficulties along 2011. In the consolidated Financial 
Statements, CA affirms that the overall impact of Greek crisis was of €2.378 million, reduced in 
the net income.  
 




BNP Paribas presented 1.965.283 million of Euros as the total amount of Assets, once again in 
line with the previous year. To what concerns captions measured at Fair Value, the main focus 
are Financial Assets Fair Valued through Profit &Loss, which represents around 41,7%, and 
Available-for-Sale Financial Assets. This last caption had suffered a small decrease in 
comparison with the previous year, which is related to the treatment of Greek Governments as it 
can be concluded further on. (See Table 10 presented beneath.) 
 
Table 10 - BNP Paribas Total Assets 
 
Table 11 presents a briefly breakdown of the Available-for-Sale caption taking into consideration 
that it is the caption embodying the majority of the Government Bonds.  
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Table 11 - Available-for-Sale Financial Assets caption 
Government Bonds symbolize 55% of this caption, having suffered a significant decrease 
comparing with 2010. This reduction is explained with the reclassification made by this Bank 
during the FY2011.  
 
To what concerns Assets valued at Fair Value, table 12, presented beneath, shows the 
breakdown among the Fair value hierarchy. In line with CA’s analysis, the majority of the assets 
are measured according the second level – around 70%, and just 3% are measured according 
to internal models.  
 
 
Table 12 – Breakdown of Financial Assets by Fair Value’s hierarchy 
After this presentation regarding the main captions of assets measured at Fair Value, it is now 
presented how BNP Paribas treated Greek Government Bonds. Once again, it is necessary to 
refer the actions taken in the middle of the year (30th June 2011).  
	  
 
Table 13 - Sovereign Exposures to Eurozone countries facing financial difficulties 
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In the table above (Table13), it is presented the sovereign exposure of BNP Paribas to the five 
countries facing financial problems. The amounts represented incorporate both Sovereign Debt 
classified as banking book and trading book. The total sovereign exposure of this bank had 
sharply decreased from 32.980 million Euros at the end of the FY2010 to 21.383 million of 
Euros in FY2011. The principal reduction, from 15,3% to 5,6 %, was with Greece.  
 
• Actions taken at 30th June 2011 
 
As in the case of Crédit Agricole, BNP Paribas took different types of valuation methodology for 
the Greek Government Bonds, related to the support plan dated 21st July. 
 
1. The securities held with a maturity superior to December 2020, which were 
about 1.748 million of Euros, were recognized in the balance sheet with a 21% 
discount. This discount ended in an impairment loss of €534 million recognized 
in the Cost of Risk. 
 
2. The securities not eligible for the support plan totalled 1.029 million of Euros – 
amount valued according to internal models, Level 3 of the Fair Value 
Hierarchy.  
 
Regarding the securities mentioned in the last two points, BNP Paribas reclassified them from 
the caption “Available-for-Sale” to the “Loans and Receivables”. According to the audited figures 
at the year-end (2011) this reclassification was based on the paragraph 50 E of IAS 39, which 
states that is possible in exceptional circumstances. 
 
3. To what concerns securities from the trading book, according to the unaudited 
figures of June 2011, all were measured according level three, internal models.  
 
• Actions taken at 31st December 2011 
 
Due to the agreement dated on the 26th October, BNP Paribas had to make some significant 
modifications on the measurement of the Greek Government Bonds. The measures taken were 
based on the proposal of the Institute of International Finance (IIF), which represented the 
private-sector creditors.  
 
Taking into consideration the second bailout package and the corroboration of BNP Paribas to 
help Greece’s imminent default, BNP wrote down Greek Government Bonds held in 75%. 
According to the 2011 audited figures, this loss was calculated based on: a discount rate of 12% 
on future cash flows; the haircut of 50% of NPV; the immediate repayment of 15% of amounts 
owed through EFSF’s securities with two years maturity and responsibility for paying market 
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interest rates, the payment of accrued interest through EFSF securities with a maturity of six 
months and once again paying market interest rates; a coupon of 3% until 2020 and 3,75% 
subsequently on securities maturing between 2023 and 2042 received in exchange for existing 
securities.  
 
The 75% write down ended up in a loss of 3.241 million of Euros, recognized in Cost of Risk. 
 
Table 14 – Cost of Risk for the period 
As it can be seen in the table above – Table 14 – the written down of Greek Sovereign Debt 
represented almost 50% of the net amount of impairment losses for the year 2011. Hence, on 
the 30th June 2011, BNP Paribas had reclassified 3.186 million of euros of Greek Sovereign 
Securities from “Available-for-Sale” to “Loans and Receivables”. As at 31st December, BNP 
presented on balance sheet 1.201 million of Euros (carrying value of the securities, according to 
BNP’s internal valuation model the securities amounted to €1.133 million) of Greek Bonds as 
“Loans and Receivables” – €1.046 million in Banking Book and €166 million in trading book.  
 
5.3.3 Société Générale  
 
Société Générale (SG), presented at the year-end 1.181.372 million of Euros as the total 
amount of Assets – Table 15, presented beneath. The prevalent caption measured at Fair Value 
is Financial Assets at Fair Value through profit or loss, symbolizing 35,8% of the total Assets of 
the company.  
 
Table 15 - SG Total Assets 
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Available-for-sale Financial Assets represent 10,6% of the total and is the caption embodying 
the majority of the Sovereign Debt of this bank. Furthermore, SG has Government Bonds in the 
caption Held-to-Maturity which represents just 0,1% of its total Assets.  
 
 
Table 16 - Available-for-Sale Financial Assets broken by FV hierarchy 
 
Table 16 presents a description of Available-for-Sale caption, broken down by the three levels 
of Fair Value hierarchy. “Bonds and other debt securities” represent 91% of this caption which 
justifies the fact that 81% of this caption is measured according to market prices, level 1.  Level 
2 denotes 17% of the total caption, and last but not least, just around 3% of the assets are 
measured according to internal models. Moreover, this caption had suffered a slightly increase 
of 20,1% from 2010 to 2011.  
 
 
Table 17 - SG Sovereign Exposure to the Eurozone countries facing financial difficulties 
 
To what concerns SG’s sovereign exposure, as it can be seen in table 17, presented above, it 
was reduced in almost a half in the last year, more precisely 48%. Once again, the sharply 
reduction was regarding Greece, which decreased from €2.700 in 2010 to €423 million of Euros.  
 
According to the unaudited figures H12011, SG possessed Greek Government Bonds in three 
different captions:  
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• Available-for-Sale Financial Assets in the amount of 1.417 million of Euros; 
• Loans and Receivables with 187 million of Euros; 
• 35 million of Euros in the Held-to-Maturity caption.  
 
The amounts presented above are after the write-down done on the 21st July in 21% of the 
principal in all the securities held by that time. In this sense, Société Générale did not reclassify 
its Greek sovereign exposure, but instead, measured it according to the 3rd level of the Fair 
Value hierarchy.  
 
Once again referring the report for the first half of the year, SG recognized losses from Greece 
in two different times: 
1) Before the write-down of 21%, SG recognised €369,1 million of unrealised losses on 
Available-for-Sale directly in equity (amount before tax). 
 
2) The write-down in 21% of the nominal value of the Greek securities was recorded in 
Cost of Risk in the amount of €394,8 million. This amount was recorded in the first half 
Corporate Centre income statement. The intention was to reallocate it to each business 
line when the bonds were exchanged.  
 
As it was stated previously, this exchange never happened. Due to the second European 
Summit, SG realized the haircut of 50% of the principal of all the Greek securities held. 
 
According to the audited financial figures of 2011, as at December 2011, banking book 
sovereign exposure to Greece was of €346 million. This amount was distributed in the three 
captions mentioned before:  
 Available-for-Sale Financial Assets in the amount of 329 million of Euros; 
 Loans and Receivables with 6 million of Euros; 
 11 million of Euros in the Held-to-Maturity caption.  
 
Under the caption “Available-for-Sale” SG carried, before write-down and valued at amortised 
cost, €1.016 million and under “Held-to-maturity” €45 million. The securities measured in these 
captions, held on the 31st December 2011 were written down, in line with the previous two 
banks, in 75% of their nominal value.  
 
The loss was recorded, once again, in the Cost of Risk in the amount of €783 million. From this 
amount, the impact in the Net Income of the Group was -€554 million of Euros, being the rest 
reallocated to the business lines’ Profit & Loss. Société Générale released that the amount 
recognised from the haircut would have been of €736 million if considering the rare transaction 
prices of the market.  
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According to the consolidated financial statements for FY2011, the overall sovereign exposure 
(Table 17) was sharply reduced through the redemption of bonds at maturity, in the amount of 
€574 million, and one-off disposals of €699 million.  Once again these actions were taken in line 
with a group’s intention to soothe the overall sovereign exposure.  
 
5.4 Basic for conclusions 
 
The three analyzed banks represent around 60% of the banking sector in France and they are 
the most exposed worldwide banks to the Greek Sovereign Debt. The table (Table 18) beneath 
summarizes some of the most important figures for the three banks.  
 
 
Table 18- Main Figures of 2011 
 
From this figures, BNP Paribas is the largest analyzed bank, with the highest amounts of 
assets, market-share and a net income for the fiscal year of 2011. It is followed by market-share 
and amount of assets by Crédit Agricole, nonetheless is the only bank presenting a negative net 
income for the period (€1,4 billion). Société Générale was the bank which share price 
decreased the most for the last year, around 57% in comparison with the previous year (see 
Table 19).  
 
 Share Prices 
In Euros CA BNP SG 
31.12.2011 4,36 30,35 17,21 
31.12.2010 9,50 47,61 40,22 
Table 19 - Shares Prices for the three French banks analysed 
 
In general, and like it was mentioned in previous sections, the shares’ prices of the three banks 
suffered severely along 2011. The lowest variation was BNP Paribas, with a decrease of around 
36% from 2010 to 2011. To what concerns specifically the Greek Debt and its impacts in each 
bank, the next table (Table 20) summarizes the Sovereign Exposures as well as the impact 
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 31.12.2011 31.12.2010 
(in million of euros) CA BNP SG CA BNP SG 
Greek Sovereign Exposure 112 1.201 423 655 5.046 2.700 
Total Cost of Risk  5.657 6.797 4.330 3.777 4.802 4.160 
 - Greek Impairment Recognised under 
Cost of Risk 1.326 3.241 890 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
% 23% 48% 21% n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Total Cost of Risk without Greek 
impairment 4.331 3.556 3.440 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
 Table 20 - Cost of Risk and Sovereign Exposures to Greece 
 
The three banks extremely reduced their exposure to Greece, in average, around 86% from 
2010 to 2011. As it can be seen, BNP Paribas is the most exposed bank to Greece, followed by 
Société Générale and at last by Crédit Agricole. Considering that the three banks recorded the 
impairments arising out from the Greek Debt under the Cost of Risk, a briefly comparison is 
extremely valuable.  
 
As it was expected by its size and performance, BNP is the one with the highest amount 
recorded under the Cost of Risk. Nonetheless, in absolute terms, it is the bank most affected by 
the Greek impairment, 48% of the Cost of Risk registered for the period. Without Greece, BNP 
would have presented a smaller amount in the Cost of Risk caption – precisely less 26% - than 
in the previous year.  
 
Société Générale, being the second bank most exposed to Greece, had succeeded in 
maintaining substantially the same amount recorded under the Cost of Risk caption. Do notice 
that without Greece impairment, Société Générale would have reduced its Cost of Risk in 17% 
in comparison with 2010.  
 
Crédit Agricole analysis requires a quite different approach. At the outset, and considering just 
the data presented in the tables above, CA presented a negative net income of €1.470 million, 
comparing to €1.263 million of 2010. Additionally, the amount recorded under Cost of Risk had 
duplicated (49.8%) and the share price had declined for a half from 2010 to 2011. Do notice that 
the Greek Debt impairment recorded under the Cost of Risk just weighted 23% of the total 
amount for the period. Though, like it was mentioned in the previous sections, CA possesses 
Emporiki Bank, a Greek bank. The total amount recorded for 2011, with the impairment of 
Emporiki, is €2.378 million, which corresponds to around 58% of the total amount in Cost of 
Risk for the period.  
 
What's more, it was interesting to conclude about the different accounting treatment of the 
Greek Debt from each bank. On the one hand, BNP Paribas reclassified the Greek Sovereign 
Debt from “Available for Sale” caption to “Loans and Receivable”, mentioning the 50E 
paragraph of IAS 39. This specific paragraph states that “A financial asset classified as 
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available for sale that would have met the definition of loans and receivables (if it had not been 
designated as available for sale) may be reclassified out of the available-for-sale category to the 
loans and receivables category if the entity has the intention and ability to hold the financial 
asset for the foreseeable future or until maturity.” According to the consolidated financial 
statements, BNP Paribas aims to hold these assets until their maturity, which actually is one of 
the intentions of the exchange plan proposed to the private sector. With this reclassification, 
according to IAS 39, the Greek Sovereign Debt should be reclassified as its fair value on the 
date of reclassification. The FV of the financial asset on the date of reclassification becomes its 
new amortized cost. In this sense, supposedly, BNP Paribas changed its valuation concept 
regarding Greek Debt.  
 
Furthermore, a deeply analysis to this reclassification, under IAS 39, triggered another 
controversy. According to the paragraph mentioned above, the financial assets previous 
classified under Available-for-Sale meet the definition of Loans and Receivables, which 
according to the same standard “are non-derivative financial assets with fixed or determinable 
payments that are not quoted in an active market (…)”41. Being cognizant of this straightforward 
definition, some doubts arise from this reclassification. Even considering the illiquidity for the 
Greek Debt, it is still a quoted asset. Nonetheless, under “Loans and Receivables”, BNP 
Paribas is not compelled to recognized on a “regular” basis, the fair value changes in its equity, 
like it is required to “Available-for-Sale” Financial Assets.  
 
On the other hand, Société Générale and Crédit Agricole did not reclassify its Greek Debt. 
Société Générale maintained its Greek Sovereign Debt classification under the three main 
captions of a bank: Available for Sale, Loans and Receivables and Held-to-Maturity, which 
would denote that the exposure present in Available for Sale would be at market prices, and the 
financial assets under the other captions, would be recorded at amortized cost. Lastly, Crédit 
Agricole has its entirely Sovereign Debt Exposure classified under “Available for Sale”.  
 
In spite of everything, the overall exposure from the three banks is valued according to Level 3, 
with an exception from SG’s trading book, which is still valued at market prices considering its 
low maturity – less than one year.  Do notice that the Level 3, valuation through internal models, 
corresponding to the last category of the FV hierarchy, just represents, in average, 3% of the 
assets measured at FV for the three analyzed banks. 
 
Finally, from the previous analysis to these banks, the bank, which had experienced more 
damages from the Greek crisis, was Crédit Agricole. Before a final conclusion a brief 
comparison is made taking into consideration the EBA capital exercise, dated September 2011.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 IAS 39 – Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement 
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This exercise was done with the purpose of creating an exceptional and temporary capital buffer 
to face the Sovereign Debt crisis. In the scope of this exercise, EBA requested the same 
concepts of the 2011 EU-wide stress test to calculate the Core Tier one capital (CT1) with one 
exception: for this specific one-off exercise, banks were allowed to include some more 
instruments that appear to be solid enough to absorb potential losses. The main objective was 
to reach a CT1 of 9% until the end of June 2012. The results for the three banks are shown 
below (Table 21). All the data presented refers to the position of the banks as at 30th 
September 2011.  
 
 
Table 21 - Results to the EBA's capital exercise - September 2011 
 
The difference between the CT1(1) and the CT1(2) is that the second one is after the buffer of 
sovereign exposures (to the overall Sovereign Debt). This buffer was determined according to 
the usual prudential rules, but EBA had asked banks to measure their sovereign exposure 
within the captions “Loans and Receivables” and “Held-to-Maturity” at market-prices. (EBA had 
presumed that the Sovereign Debt classified in “Available-for-sale” would be at market-prices, 
as the standards compels to.) Moreover, EBA had asked as well to remove the prudential filters 
from Sovereign Debt of Available-for-sale financial assets. This exercise had considered both 
trading and banking book.  
 
The CT1 as at 31st December 2011 for each bank are presented below (Table 22).  
 
Table 22 - Core Tier One as at 31st December2011 
 
In December 2011, the French banks had already reached the CT1 of 9%, required for June 
2012. To what concerns BNP Paribas, referring the results in the table above -  Table 22, the 
difference between the CT1 (1) and CT1(2) is 40bp, which corresponds to the capital shortfall of 
€1,5 billion. EBA had established that the sovereign capital buffer determined in this exercise 
would not be revised. In this sense, BNP Paribas reached a CT1 of 9,2%, a diminution of 40 bp 
for European Sovereign Debt held. 
 
What’s more, by September 2011, IASB came to public through a letter to European Securities 
and Markets Authority (ESMA) declaring some concerns regarding the differences within the 
financial institutions methodologies to value the Greek Sovereign Debt. According to IASB there 
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were at the time inconsistencies whether Greek Debt classified, as Available-for-Sale, was 
subject of impairment. Moreover, IASB was cognizant with cases where Greek Debt was 
measured according to internal models, being classified under the caption previous mentioned. 
Both cases were seen in this dissertation.  




Fair Value accounting has been increasingly used in accounting standards launched in the last 
decade. At the same time, the world had entered in a financial crisis, which consequently ended 
up with the collapse of some countries’ financial systems. Under a massive lack of confidence in 
markets and numerous bankruptcies, several experts triggered a debate around the accounting 
methods in use, questioning the benefits and shortfalls of the Fair Value Accounting. 
 
At first, the pro-cyclicality effect arising out from the Fair Value Accounting is seen as the 
foremost setback. Focusing on financial institutions, having a balance sheet at market prices 
induces an extra source of volatility. Market prices play a double-edge role: besides reflecting 
the fundamentals, influence the actions taken by market participants, which means that when 
the price of an asset falls, under Fair Value Accounting the incentive is to sell. Under massive 
assets sales, prices fall under the fundamentals; consequently markets destabilize, prejudicing 
the ones that decided to hold the assets. Nonetheless, with the main limitation comes the core 
benefit: fair value is the only accounting method which presents updated and transparent 
balance sheets. Balance sheets, under observed prices, mirror the real situation of a bank.  
 
What’s more, and focusing on the European Sovereign Debt Crisis which had put markets’ 
liquidity under pressure, the second FV’s shortfall crops up: the Level 3 from the Fair Value 
hierarchy, based on internal models. This level entails managerial judgment, once it is based on 
unobserved inputs. Contemplating Greece’s example, due to the illiquidity of the Sovereign 
Debt, banks massively valued it under internal models. In the case of the three French banks 
analyzed, in average, Fair Value Financial Assets valued according to level 3 just represented 
3% of the Total Assets Fair Valued. Do notice that almost the overall Greek exposures of these 
banks were according to internal models.  
 
Still representative of such a small amount, the net income of these banks sharply reduced in 
the last year. Crédit Agricole presented a negative net income of €1,4 billion, 200% less than in 
2010, followed by Société Genérale, with a diminution of 39%. Whereas the direct impact of 
Greek Sovereign Debt impairment under Société Générale’s Cost of Risk was of around 21%. 
Ultimately, BNP Paribas, reduced its net income in 23%, but the impairment recognized under 
the Cost of Risk represented 48% of the total for the period. Consequently, being cognizant with 
these numbers and the overall exposure of these banks to Greece, investors for sure preferred 
the Greek Debt mark-to-market valued, even more considering that investors had to assume 
losses of more than 50%. (See Table 23) 
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Table 23 - Important Figures related to Greek impairment 
 
Secondly, within the same country, and under the same supervisors, each bank classified 
differently its Greek Debt Sovereign Debt. From this case analysis, Greek Debt appears in three 
categories defined by IAS 39: “Available for Sale”, “Held-to-Maturity” and “Loans and 
Receivables”. Even considering the augmentation of the FV standards in the last decade, the 
actual ones give space for different types of action: Available-for-Sale Financial Assets are 
recorded according to market-prices and the changes of the fair value are directly recorded 
under the “Other Comprehensive Income” (equity); when the asset is impaired, the impairment 
is recognized under the Cost of Risk, and the previous losses are reversed from equity to P&L. 
Under the captions “Held-to-maturity” and “Loans and Receivables”, financial assets are 
recorded under their amortized cost and impairments are directly recognized in P&L. Thus, 
under the Available for Sale caption, banks are forced to recognize in an on-going basis the 
losses from the Greek Debt in their equity whereas, under the other two captions, banks just 
recognized Greek Sovereign Debt’s losses when the impairment is assessed.  
 
All things considered, banks, under the actual standards, are able to classify and treat 
differently a quoted financial asset, suffering from markets illiquidity: the classification within the 
four categories of IAS 39 has the consequent impacts on banks’ performance and the internal 
model valuation can or cannot be representative of the real value of the financial asset. Hence, 
the managerial judgment opens space of another debate. Under level 3, when a bank decrease 
or increase a price, the question would be: as the financial asset had gone through an actual 
deviation from the previous price or the action compromises managers intention to obtain better 
results?  
 
Thirdly, there must be a clearly distinction between accounting policies and prudential concerns. 
On the one hand, from the regulators’ point of view, Basel 2.5 imposed banks to meet a CT1 of 
9% by June 2012. Regulators are pressuring even more the financial sector regarding capital 
requirements: under Basel 3 banks will have to meet a CT1 of 7% by the end of 2018. Another 
regulators’ concern is to improve the capital’s definition per si, ensuring that it actually absorbs 
potential losses. The recognition of economic losses is essential to reach an accurate measure 
of capital. On the one hand, in a nutshell, under Fair Value Accounting and due to its pro-
cyclicality, when banks’ assets prices drop banks are compelled to sell its assets in order 
achieve the capital ratios. On the other hand, from an accounting perspective, IFRS 9 will 
compel banks to use even more a fair value approach to measure their financial instruments.  
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All in all, Fair Value Accounting increases transparency and consequently ascertains markets’ 
confidence.  Moreover, its application is expected to increase in the upcoming years. From an 
investors’ point of view, Fair Value ensures their updated knowledge of banks’ assets. For the 
banking sector, a Fair Value based approach for its assets, with enlarged and appropriate 
disclosures to reduce the pro-cyclicality effect, and lastly with more demanding capital 
requirements to guarantee buffers absorbing all the losses, will be the best solution to recover 
from the crisis and restore markets’ confidence and liquidity. 
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Exhibit 2 - Changes of Sovereign exposure from 30th June to 31st December for the countries 
facing financial difficulties 






Greek contagion fears spread to other EU banks 
By Megan Murphy, Kerin Hope, Jennifer Thompson and James Wilson 
“European banks’ exposure to Greece unnerved investors again as Moody’s said it might cut the credit ratings of 
France’s three largest banks because of their large holdings in Greek debt. 
Pressure is mounting on Eurozone leaders to agree a fresh bail-out for the debt-laden country involving private 
creditors bearing part of the costs, after Greece earlier this week became the lowest-rated sovereign in the world.  
Moody’s on Wednesday placed BNP Paribas, Crédit Agricole and Société Générale on review for a possible 
downgrade, citing the potential for “inconsistency” between the impact of a Greek default or restructuring and their 
current rating levels. 
“Following the deterioration of Greece’s creditworthiness, although still manageable, the risk is likely to have increased 
for certain banks,” said Nick Hill, analyst at Moody’s Investors Service.  
“This results from both the direct effects of a potential default and the secondary effects, in terms of a potential 
deterioration of Greek private sector credit.” 
French banks are among Greece’s biggest creditors, with $53bn in overall net exposure to Greek private and public 
debt, according to the latest figures from the Bank for International Settlements. German banks are also exposed with 
$34bn, including loans made through KfW.  
While some analysts said the prospect of a Greek default had already been priced into European bank stocks, shares 
in BNP, Crédit Agricole and SocGen slid by between 2.3 and 2.6 per cent on Wednesday as shareholders digested the 
Moody’s report.  
Concerns are growing that a restructuring of Greece’s debt could have a potentially disastrous knock-on effect on the 
European financial system, with several commentators drawing a comparison with the investor panic sparked by the 
collapse of US investment bank Lehman Brothers in 2008.  
Ministers are considering three options for private sector involvement, set out in a briefing paper circulated by the 
European Commission and seen by the Financial Times. The most drastic is for a voluntary debt exchange, involving 
an extension of maturities on Greek government bonds to buy time for Athens to cope with its debt crisis. The second 
and third options are for a voluntary “rollover” of bonds, which would be less likely to trigger a bond downgrade.  
A restructuring would have “very dangerous implications”, the European Central Bank warned on Wednesday, in a 
report that highlights a number of risks to the Eurozone’s biggest banks. 
Vítor Constâncio, vice-president, said all banks that had posted Greek government debt as collateral with the ECB 
would face an impact if a Greek debt restructuring were treated as a default. The ECB has said it could not accept as 
collateral any defaulted bonds, leaving Greek banks in particular facing a massive financing need.  
In Athens, bankers were sceptical of claims, contained in the same briefing paper, that they would need an additional 
€20bn ($28bn) of capital if private sector creditors were involved in a new bail-out package. “We desperately need 
liquidity not capital,” said one senior Athens banker. “We can’t deleverage fast enough under current conditions.” 
Greek banks, which are waiting to access a €30bn package of additional state guarantees pledged by the government, 
have been dependent on the ECB for liquidity since losing access to wholesale and interbank markets 18 months ago 
at the start of the crisis. 
All six first and second-tier Greek banks reported modest net profits in the first quarter, in spite of significantly 
increased provisions for bad loans. Their core tier one capital ratio stands at about 10.5 per cent. One banker said the 
ECB, as the Eurozone’s lender of last resort, could continue to accept Greek collateral even if the sovereign rating was 
downgraded to a selective default. “This is what a lender of resort is there for,” he said. 
The Greek central bank is setting tighter conditions for allocating the new package of guarantees, including a medium-
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Exhibit 3 - Greek contagion fears spread to other EU banks by FT 
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Exhibit 4 - CAC 40 - Source: Wikipédia 
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Exhibit 5 - Evolution of Core Tier 1, Core Tier 1 Capital and RWA for the three banks 
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Exhibit 6 - BNP Balance-sheet 
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Exhibit 7 - BNP Income Statement 
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Exhibit 8 - Société Générale Balance-sheet 
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Exhibit 9 - Société Générale Income Statement 
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Exhibit 10 - Crédit Agricole Balance-sheet 
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Exhibit 11 - Crédit Agricole Income Statement 
